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This thesis discusses the legitimacy of fractional-reserve banking under the title-transfer theory 
of contract. Fractional-reserve banking is the practice of banks lending out some of the money 
that is deposited with them. This can be contrasted to a 100% reserve system in which all 
deposited funds are held by the bank at all times. The title-transfer theory of contract posits that 
all contracts are the exchange of title to some piece of property and that all title to a particular 
piece of property can only be held by one individual at a time. Fractional-reserve banking 
appears to create a problem for the title-transfer theory of contract since it seems that both the 
depositor of money and those who borrow money from the bank have title to the money that was 
originally deposited. This is what is known as the double-title to property problem. 
Essentially, this thesis dissolves the double-title to property problem by offering a conceptual 
understanding of bank deposits as a form of call loan in which bank depositors give up title to 
money they deposit thus never creating an instance in which two titles to the same piece of 
property arises in the practice of fractional-reserve banking. This conceptual understanding of 
bank deposits describes fractional-reserve banking in a way which is ultimately different from 
how some who oppose fractional-reserve banking have described it. The call loan understanding 
views banks as debtors and depositors as their creditors who hold debt which is callable at any 
time. This understanding can be contrasted to the view that banks offers warehouse services that 
protect deposited money and bank depositors are people who seek to have their money protected 
and safeguarded by the bank. 
This thesis then explores some of the practical implications of conceptualizing bank deposits as 
call loans. While some have argued that banks must be bound by different rules when it comes to 
treasury management, bankruptcy, and contract formation, this thesis explores how banks can 
operate just like any other business that must practice debt management while dealing with 
uncertainty. This analysis engages with existing criticisms which posit that business practices for 
fractional-reserve banks must be different from other businesses in order to protect creditors 
from conditions which critics claim do not appear in other industries. This thesis argues that any 
such concerns regarding the treatment of creditors by fractional-reserve banks can already be 
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 Fractional-reserve banking is the form of banking that is practiced virtually universally in 
almost all countries. When depositors deposit money at a bank, some of that money is lent out, 
meaning that not all deposited funds are kept on hand, hence, the “fractional-reserve” moniker. 
This can be contrasted to a one-hundred-percent reserve banking in which all deposited funds are 
held at all times by the bank. It is the fractional-reserve form of banking in which banks can act 
as credit intermediaries from depositors to borrowers and makes up the foundation of our 
domestic and international monetary system. While this is the way in which almost all banks 
everywhere operate, the legitimacy or desirability of such a system has become a question of 
contemporary political importance. For example, in 2018 a referendum in Switzerland asked if 
banks should be forced to hold all deposits on hand. This proposal was struck down, but it shows 
that even this well-established and long-time practice is being questioned. 
 Those interested in the ethics of fractional-reserve banking have criticized its practices as 
fraudulent on various grounds. One particular brand of criticisms, which are addressed in this 
thesis, have arisen within a certain conception of property and contract. This theory of property 
asserts that we come to own resources by either being the first person to use that resource or by 
voluntarily exchanging for the resource with its previous owner. This theory of property and 
contract is one way of making more precise the conception of property broadly outlined by 
Robert Nozick’s entitlement theory by creating explicit conceptual understandings of the 
principle of justice in acquisition and the principle of justice in transfer. Thus, this debate and the 
particular criticisms of fractional-reserve banking derive from a largely libertarian way of 
thinking. In fact, most of this debate has been between two schools of thought within libertarian 
scholarship; the Rothbardians and the Free Bankers. As I will argue here, this particular view of 
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property is sufficiently similar to our folk-understanding of property and contract that the 
conclusions drawn in this thesis still have bearing on our current social, corporate, legal, and 
financial practices. 
 The particular conceptions of property and contract through which this debate has been 
framed are the Rothbardian view of property and the title-transfer theory of contract. In the first 
chapter, the specifics of these conceptions are outlined and explained. From these particular 
conceptions of property and contract, three criticisms of fractional-reserve banking have been 
posited by the Rothbardians. The first is that fractional-reserve banking is inherently deceitful as 
depositors do not know that money that they deposit with banks is being lent out to other 
borrowers. This empirical question is not addressed by this thesis. The second criticism is that 
fractional-reserve banking creates a double-title to property in which two people simultaneously 
own the same piece of property, namely, some piece of money. If this is the case, it is 
problematic because two people would have the right to use that money for incompatible 
purposes. For example, one could spend it on an apple, and the other on a laptop. This problem 
appears to arise within the practice of fractional-reserve banking as the depositor of the money 
and the one who borrows money from the bank both appear as though they own the money. In 
the second chapter, this concern is addressed by offering a conception of the bank deposit in 
which the depositor gives up ownership of money deposited to the bank when they deposit 
money. The third criticism of fractional-reserve banking is that it is inherently insolvent. Since 
all depositors could, at any time, ask for money deposited and fractional-reserve banks by their 
nature necessarily do not have all deposited funds on hand, then it is theoretically possible at any 
time for banks to become quickly insolvent. However, as I argue in the third chapter, the risks of 
becoming insolvent that banks face are not operationally or ethically different from risks other 
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businesses face. Thus, to the extent that we can trust other businesses to operate without risk of 
insolvency, we can trust banks to operate similarly. 
 The second chapter of this thesis offers a conceptual account of the bank deposit as a call 
loan. The call loan is a loan in which the lender lends money to a borrower but has the right to 
ask for the lent funds back at any time (i.e. the lender has the right to “call” the loan). With this 
conception of the bank deposit the double-title to property problem never arises. Bank depositors 
give up title to the money and then banks lend that money out, giving title to borrowers. Viewed 
in this way, there is no instance in which more than one person has title to the deposited money. 
 The third chapter explores the practical implications of this view of bank deposits. These 
are immediate prima facie implications which cannot take into account all of the complexities of 
banking practices. These practices are fraught with operational and ethical difficulties and will 
not all be addressed in this thesis. For example, neither the implications of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation or the Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation nor potentially private 
alternatives to these institutions are considered herein. However, these immediate and prima 
facie implications are still able to help us navigate and respond to some Rothbardian criticisms of 
fractional-reserve banking as well as illustrate how fractional-reserve banks can operate in 
bankruptcy, treasury management, and loan formation. 
 The question of how fractional-reserve banks might operate legitimately has arisen out of 
a libertarian way of thinking through debate between the Rothbardians and the Free Bankers. 
Nonetheless, the conclusions reached in this thesis still offer important implications about our 
common conceptions of bank deposits and the fractional-reserve practices which follow from 
them. This conception then offers us a way of addressing particular criticisms of fractional-
reserve banking which have arisen from this debate. This thesis does not attempt to offer a 
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complete picture of how fractional-reserve banking can be ethically practiced. Nonetheless, this 
thesis provides a conception of fractional-reserve banking which helps elucidate our 
contemporary fractional-reserve practices and offers practical conclusions from which we can 
draw on in order to more fully understand the nature of an ethical fractional-reserve banking 
system. 
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Chapter 1 – Property, Contract, and Fractional-Reserve Banking 
 
The Rothbardian View of Property & Contracts 
 
In 1988, in an attempt to explicitly define and make clear the differences between 
capitalism and socialism, Hans-Hermann Hoppe writes, “Capitalism … is a social system based 
on the explicit recognition of private property and of nonaggressive, contractual exchanges 
between private property owners.” (1988/2010, 10) Recognizing property rights as the essential 
characteristic of capitalism, Murray Rothbard in his 1982 chapter, “Property Rights and the 
Theory of Contracts”, aims explicitly at a theory of contracts which recognizes private property 
as the ultimate source of the right to make contracts. He writes, 
The right of property implies the right to make contracts about that property: to 
give it away or to exchange titles of ownership for the property of another person. 
Unfortunately, many libertarians, devoted to the right to make contracts, hold the 
contract itself to be an absolute, and therefore maintain that any voluntary contract 
whatever must be legally enforceable in the free society. Their error is a failure to 
realize that the right to contract is strictly derivable from the right of private 
property, and therefore that the only enforceable contracts (i.e., those backed by the 
sanction of legal coercion) should be those where the failure of one party to abide 
by the contract implies the theft of property from the other party. (1982/2002, 133) 
What are the rights of property? J.E. Penner writes that “The currently prevailing 
understanding of property in what might be called mainstream Anglo-American legal philosophy 
is that property is best understood as a "bundle of rights."” (1996, 712). One version of the 
bundle of rights conception of property is what Penner terms the “Substantive Bundle of Rights 
View” (1996, 733). This view “emphasizes the value that owners have in their right to use and 
transfer their property” (1996, 734) and thus recognizes that property entails a right to use some 
owned resource. A subtype of the substantive view is what Penner terms the “"Disaggregative" 
Version of the Substantive Bundle of Rights View” (1996, 734). This view of property views the 
rights to the use of some resource as separable from one another. Penner explains, “On the 
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disaggregative version we regard each possible "use" of one's property under the broadest notion 
of use possible, as itself a property right if it can form the subject of a transaction, whether in the 
market or as the result of a tortious "taking."” (1996, 734) This means, for example, that property 
in a car gives one the right to drive the car, to paint the car, to change the tires on the car, etc. 
Each is a separate use-right which is given to the owner of the car.  
The Rothbardian view of property is a form of the disaggregative version of the 
substantive bundle of rights view. Rothbard’s theory of property holds that property in something 
gives the owner a bundle of use-rights and that the use-rights included in the “bundle of rights” 
includes everything except the right to physically alter the person or property of someone else.  
As Hoppe explains, “This ownership of … places and goods by a person implies his right to use 
and transform these places and goods in any way he sees fit, provided only that he does not 
change thereby uninvitedly the physical integrity of places and goods [owned] by another 
person” (1993/2006, 383). All other use of property is thus permitted under a Rothbardian view 
of property. 
How are property rights distributed in the Rothbardian view of property? As Hoppe 
explains, 
Interpersonal conflicts are always and everywhere conflicts concerning scarce 
things. I want to do X with a given thing and you want to do Y with the same thing. 
… Absent a perfect harmony of all interests, conflicts regarding scarce resources 
can only be avoided if all scarce resources are assigned as private, exclusive 
property to some specified individual. Only then can I act independently, with my 
own things, from you, with your own things, without you and me coming into 
conflict. But who owns what scarce resource as his private property and who does 
not? First: Each person owns his physical body that only he and no one else controls 
directly. … [S]econd, as for scarce resources that can be controlled only indirectly 
(that must be appropriated with our own nature-given, i.e., unappropriated, body): 
Exclusive control (property) is acquired by and assigned to that person, who 
appropriated the resource in question first or who acquired it through voluntary 
(conflict-free) exchange from its previous owner. (2018, 24-25) 
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This conception of property distribution is based in what Robert Nozick terms a 
“historical principle” (1974, 153) as property rights are assigned based on the historical 
circumstances upon which one came to own a resource. The Rothbardian distribution of property 
rights is a version of Nozick’s “Entitlement Theory” (1974, 150) made precise. Nozick describes 
the entitlement theory as follows: 
1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in 
acquisition is entitled to that holding. 
2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in 
transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding. 
3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 2. 
(1974, 151) 
The Rothbardian view of property offers explicit principles of justice in acquisition and 
in transfer. For the principle of justice in acquisition, the Rothbardian view accepts John Locke’s 
theory that one becomes the proper owner of something by having “mixed his labour with” 
(Locke, 1689/2016, 86) a previously unowned resource. And, for the principle of justice in 
transfer, ownership is transferred by voluntary mutually agreed-upon contracts between property 
owners within the constraints of the title-transfer theory of contract as will be described in detail 
below. 
The Rothbardians conception of property is just one way in which the disaggregative 
substantive view of property can offer an account of the use-rights one has over their property. 
Other versions of the disaggregative substantive view of property can take more restrictive 
forms. For example, one might have a view of property in which the bundle of rights includes 
only the right to use property insofar as it benefits the public good. This conception of property 
could still be explained as a bundle of use-rights. For example, under this conception of property, 
one may have the right to use a car to drive themselves to work, but not to drag race which may 
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be dangerous to themselves or the public. The Rothbardian view is only one view of what is 
included in the bundle of rights and not the only one. 
The reason that the Rothbardian view is explained in this project is that it has been the 
view of property through which a great part of the fractional-reserve banking debate has taken 
place. The particular importance for this project is the rights that are given to those who hold 
property in money. The Rothbardian view says that one has the right to use money in any way 
they see fit as long as it does not physically invade the property of others. Other, more narrow 
views, however, may posit that one can use money to purchase apples and oranges, but not to 
purchase marijuana, which would be permitted under the Rothbardian view. As is described 
below, other substantive views of property which are similar to our folk-understanding of 
property require a theory of contracts which meet particular criteria in order to properly 
understand how use-rights can be exchanged. Thus, in explaining the Rothbardian view of 
property and contract, we can reach conclusions about our folk-understanding of property and 
contract since, as I will argue, the two views are sufficiently similar.   
Since the Rothbardian rights of property protect one’s property from being physically 
altered by others, no contract which requires the uninvited physical invasion of someone else’s 
property can be considered legitimate in a theory of contracts compatible with a Rothbardian 
view of property. For example, a contract which stipulates that party A and party B will 
physically change the property of an unwilling participant, C, cannot be considered legitimate. It 
should be clear then that it is not any contract which must be explicitly recognized, but instead, 
only those contracts which are compatible with the right of private property. 
This fits with our already existing notions of property and contract. We often think that 
we can agree to have our own property changed or physically altered in ways which we agree to 
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but cannot agree without the consent of another property owner to change that which they own. 
Certainly, a contract which stipulates that I must vandalize or destroy someone else’s property is 
obviously criminal and could not be considered legitimate. For example, it seems that I have the 
right to have my car painted pink by a car detailer, but I do not have the right to have my 
neighbor’s car painted pink without their authorization. And, when we exchange with one 
another, we recognize that we can only exchange that which already properly belongs to us. I 
could not agree to sell your car or the right to use your car to someone else without your consent. 
Thus, it is only those contracts which determine the exchange of resources already owned by the 
parties involved in the contract which should be regarded as legitimate. 
It is also the case that a theory of contracts in line with disaggregative substantive view of 
property must never assign exclusive property rights over one resource to more than one 
individual at a time since property rights consist of the right to exclusively control a resource. A 
theory that did not meet this criterion would not avoid conflict but would, instead, guarantee that 
there be conflict over the use of that resource since more than one person would have the right to 
use the property as they please. That is to say that two people cannot be granted “the right to use 
and transform” (Hoppe 1993/2006, 383) a single resource “in any way [they] see fit” (Hoppe 
1993/2006, 383), since this would create a conflicting rights to the use of that resource. As soon 
as both parties have incompatible plans for the use of that resource, conflict must ensue. Walter 
Block uses the following example to illustrate the problem with such an allocation of property 
rights: 
[I]f A … and B … each fully own a car, then there IS a conflict in rights. Each has 
a right to do with the car what he or she wants. Now, there may not be an ACTUAL 
conflict, if they both want the car used for the same purpose. But, there is still a 
conflict in RIGHTS. A wants the car used for washing it; B wants to take it on a 
trip. They both have a RIGHT to use the car for these incompatible purposes. (2008)  
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This insight is not exclusive to the Rothbardian view of property. While the Rothbardian 
view holds that people have the right to any use of their property insofar as it does not physically 
invade the property of others, other theories of property must refrain from assigning conflicting 
rights to the use of some resource. Even with theories of property which ascribe to property 
owners more limited use-rights than the Rothbardian view (e.g. a theory of property which holds 
that the use of property can only be for the common good and no other purposes), they could not 
ascribe the right to use property to two people for incompatible purposes. Take the above car 
example from Block. Suppose that a theory of property holds that cars can be used only for the 
use of transporting oneself to and from work. This theory still could not give Jones the right to 
drive the car to his work in the west of town everyday and Smith the right to drive the car to his 
work in the east of town everyday since both these rights cannot be simultaneously fulfilled. 
There is another conclusion which can be drawn about the nature of contracts which 
conform to the Rothbardian view of property. All contracts which are compatible with the rights 
of property and are voluntarily agreed to, must be recognized as legitimate. To not recognize 
legitimate contracts amounts to a violation of property rights. Again, this aligns with how we in 
western capitalistic societies ordinarily consider the enforceability of contracts. We recognize 
that each party involved in a contract must “hold up their end of the bargain”. Imagine, for 
example, that party A contracts to sell a chair to party B for the sum of $100. Upon the delivery 
of the chair to party B, party B refuses to pay the agreed upon sum of money to party A. A 
theory which fails to recognize this contract will instead recognize as legitimate the theft of party 
A’s property and a violation of party A’s right of property. 
Further, since property rights, in the Rothbardian view, include the right of contract, any 
restriction upon the right of legitimate contract also constitutes a rights violation. If, for example, 
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party A contracts to sell a chair to party B for $100 and party C uses force to stop the transfer of 
the chair from A to B and the transfer of $100 from B to A, then C has infringed upon the 
property rights of A and B since they have lost the ability “to give it away or to exchange titles of 
ownership for the property of another person” (Rothbard, 1982/2002, 133), an essential 
characteristic of property rights. 
Once again, this conception follows our already existing folk-understanding of property 
and contract. If one has the right to use an apple by eating it, then they seem to have the right to 
sell that right. This is precisely what happens when one buys an apple from the grocery store. 
The store owner who previously owned the apple had the right to eat it but sold that right to the 
patron buying the apple. Thus, to disallow the grocery store owner the right to sell the apple 
would be an infringement on their property right over the apple. 
A theory of contracts compatible with the Rothbardian view of property, then, must i) 
recognize the right of property, ii) recognize as legitimate all contracts which are compatible 
with the right of property and iii) not restrict the creation of any contracts which are compatible 
with the right of property. In accordance with these criteria, Williamson Evers (1977) and 
Murray Rothbard (1982/2002) constructed the title-transfer theory of contract. The title-transfer 
theory of contract stipulates that all contracts are a transfer of title to some piece of property 
from the current owner to a future owner. Title is the list of rights that a property owner has over 
the use of their property. Again, as stated by Hoppe, the right of property under the Rothbardian 
view of property gives the owner of some resource, “the right to use and transform these places 
and goods in any way he sees fit, provided only that he does not change thereby uninvitedly the 
physical integrity of places and goods [owned] by another person” (Hoppe 1993/2006, 383). The 
title-transfer model is one way of making more precise the way in which we ordinarily think 
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about contracts. When we say that we contract to sell a piece of property, the title-transfer theory 
of contract stipulates that what we are actually saying is that we are transferring the right to use 
that piece of property from ourselves to the other contracting party. For example, a contract 
which stipulates the sale of some good x from party A to party B for the price of $y is formulated 
as such: Party A hereby transfers the title to good x to party B and party B hereby transfers the 
title to $y to party A. In this way, B now has the right to use the good x and A now has the right 
to use the $y.  
Title to property can be restricted or unrestricted. Unrestricted title gives the owner of 
some resource the “right to use and transform these places and goods in any way he sees fit, 
provided only that he does not change thereby uninvitedly the physical integrity of places and 
goods [owned] by another person” (Hoppe, 1993/2006. 383). This unrestricted title gives the 
owner a bundle of rights; the right to use the resource on Tuesdays, the right to use the resource 
in Toronto, the right to use the resource for fishing, the right to eat the resource, the right to sell 
the resource, etc. The owner is only barred from physically invading the property of others; all 
else is part of the bundle of rights. 
However, as this view of property is a disaggregative substantive bundle of rights view 
and thus recognizes the use-rights to a resource can be separated and sold off. By this separation 
and sale of rights one can also gain restricted title to some resource via contract. Restricted title 
gives a property owner a bundle of rights over the use of their property but not all the rights that 
come with unrestricted title. As Evers writes, “Under the title-transfer model, the rights 
pertaining to different aspects of some piece of property could be divided up among several 
actual owners … Such a right would have to belong to some existing owner (whether person or 
corporation) to have effect under the title-transfer model" (1977, 7). Someone with unrestricted 
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title to a piece of property can sell, for example, the right to use the resource on Tuesdays. Now, 
both owners have restricted title to the piece of property. The original owner has the right to use 
the resource on Mondays, Wednesdays, Thursdays, Fridays, Saturdays, and Sundays, while the 
new owner has the right to use the resource on Tuesdays.  Formulation of these contracts are 
possible only insofar as they do not create conflicting rights. For example, one could not sell the 
right to eat a cake on Monday and retain the right to eat that same cake on Tuesday since eating 
the cake on Monday makes it impossible for one to exercise their right eat the cake on Tuesday. 
Penner gives a similar explanation for all disaggregative substantive bundle of rights theories 
explaining, “my selling you the right to use my car for a day is regarded as my transferring one 
of the "sticks" of the bundle that constitutes my ownership, which stick is itself a property right. 
… [P]resumably I have 365 such sticks for each year I own it” (1996, 734). 
Title is transferred upon the mutually voluntary acceptance of the terms of the contract. 
All parties privy to the contract must agree to the give up the rights to the use of some resource 
(stipulated in the contract) which they held prior to the contract and transfer those rights to the 
other contracting party. Usually, although not in cases of gift-giving, one party gives up the right 
to the use of some resource in exchange for the right to use some other resource. Once both 
parties agree to the details of which rights are transferred from whom to whom, the contract is 
accepted and both parties gain the legal rights set out in the contract. For example, someone may 
exchange unrestricted title to a car (thus giving the new owner the right to use the car in any way 
which he so chooses provided only that he does not physically invade the property of others) in 
exchange for the restricted title to the use of the other party’s summer home, say, the right to the 
exclusive use of the summer home in the months of June and July every year. The contract is 
enacted if the first party agrees to give up their right to use the car at all and the second party 
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agrees to give up his right to the use of the summer home in the months of June and July. These 
two bundles of rights (the unrestricted right to use the car and the restricted right to use the 
summer home in June and July) are thereby transferred between parties. 
Contracts can have immediate effective dates, meaning that the rights are transferred the 
instant the contract is accepted by both parties. Or, the contract can have an effective date in the 
future, meaning that the transfer of rights does not occur until the selected date. Until this date, 
both parties retain the right to the use of the resources which they had prior to the acceptance of 
the contract, with the following restriction: Neither party may use the resources in ways which 
would hinder the ability of the future owner to take full advantage of the rights over the use that 
resource that they will gain once the effective date of the contract is reached. Consider the above 
example of the car and summer home. The car owner, prior to the acceptance of the contract, had 
unrestricted title the car. This means that he has the right to use the car in any way he sees fit. 
This includes the right to drive the car into a tree an effectively destroy the car. However, once 
he enters into the above exchange contract with a future effective date, he no longer has the right 
to destroy the car since it would hinder the car-purchaser’s right to the use of the car in the 
future. 
Kant’s Theory of Contract 
 
The title-transfer theory of contract follows in the Kantian tradition of contracts in which 
a contract involves the acquisition of rights by one party from another.1 The title-transfer theory 
of contract also conceptualizes contracts as an exchange of rights. Kant defines legal rights as 
that which corresponds to an obligation owed from one person to another which can be fulfilled 
 
1 See Kant, Immanuel. 1796/1887. The Philosophy of Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of 
Jurisprudence as the Science of Right. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 
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by actions (1796/1887, 45-46), calling them “strict rights” (1796/1887, 47). These are contrasted 
with moral rights in which one person is owed not only the obligation as manifested through 
action, but also that the person fulfilling their obligation act in accordance a virtuous conscious 
(1796/1887, 47). Strict rights are “that with which nothing ethical is intermingled” (1796/1887, 
48). One could not, for example, have a strict right to you internally wishing them well since this 
is not manifested in action. One could, however, have a right to you saying the words, “I wish 
you well” since that is itself an action. As Kant writes, “A strict Right, then, in the exact sense of 
the term, is that which alone can be called wholly external” (1796/1887, 48)  
These rights, obligations that we owe to one another, can be both created and transferred 
though contract. For Kant, a contract “consists of two juridical Acts: The PROMISE and its 
ACCEPTANCE” (1796/1887, 21). The promisor offers the terms of the contract to the acceptor 
and the acceptor accepts them, binding both to the terms of the contract. For Kant, this means 
that one or both parties are now owed a different set of obligations than they were before they 
entered into a contract. Kant separates these into three types of contracts; 1) “Gratuitous 
Contracts” (1796/1887, 122) in which only one party acquires new rights, 2) “Onerous 
Contracts” (1796/1887, 122) in which both parties acquire new rights and 3) “Cautionary 
Contracts” (1796/1887, 122) in which neither party acquires rights but instead, are guaranteed 
their already acquired rights by certain precautions (e.g. a surety in which one promises to have 
their obligations performed by another party or agent). Contemporary title-transfer theory of 
contract, within the Rothbardian view of property, stipulates that the obligations that are owed 
when one gains a property right over some resource is the obligation of all others to not 
physically invade the resource which has come under their own exclusive control (their 





Rothbard defines fraud as “failure to fulfill a voluntarily agreed upon transfer of 
property” (1982/2002, 143) as it amounts to “implicit theft” (1982/2002, 143). Rothbard uses the 
following as a clear example of fraud: “If … A sells to B a package which A says contains a 
radio, and it contains only a pile of scrap metal, then A has taken B’s money and not fulfilled the 
agreed upon conditions for such a transfer—the delivery of a radio” (1982/2002, 143). In the 
above listed case, what has occurred is that upon the agreement to the terms of the contract by 
both parties, title to a radio is transferred from A to B and title to money is transferred from B to 
A. In both cases the transfer of title can only be considered legitimate upon the actual delivery of 
the promised property. A has only truly transferred title to his radio to B when he receives the 
money from B and B has only truly transferred title to his money when he receives the radio 
from A. The transfer of title is conditional upon the other side of the contract being upheld. In 
this case, B did not receive the radio and therefore has not legitimately transferred title to his 
money to A. Thus, if A takes B’s money, he is stealing money which is not his since the money 
only became his upon the delivery of the radio. Thus, title-transfer of theory of contract offers us 
definitive ground for understanding when fraud has occurred: when one party fails “to fulfill a 




 Fractional-reserve banking is the form of banking which we are most familiar with today. 
When we deposit money into the bank, the bank takes some proportion of that money, and lends 
it out to others, who borrow the money at a specified interest rate. In turn, the bank pays the 
depositor interest on their deposits (with profitable business practices) at a rate lower than the 
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borrowers are paying to the bank. In this way, the bank acts as a credit intermediary between 
depositor and borrower: The depositor can lend their money to others without the work of 
searching for a borrower and negotiating a rate or bearing the risk of non-payment from the 
borrower (although they still incur the risk of non-repayment from the bank). The amount of 
deposited money which can be lent out is often set by statute known as the minimum reserve 
ratio. This is the minimum percentage of deposited money that banks must keep on-hand so that 
depositors have access to the money in their bank accounts.2 For example, with a minimum 
reserve ratio of 10%, for every $100 deposited, $90 can be lent out and $10 must be held by the 
bank. 
 When depositors deposit money with a bank, they are given what are known as deposit 
certificates. These certificates state that the holder of the certificate has the right to ask for the 
specified amount of money deposited from the bank at any time. Deposit certificates can and 
historically have taken on multiple forms. Early paper money in Europe, for example, was the 
use of paper deposit certificates which depositors could use to demand gold deposited at banks or 
with goldsmiths at any time. When a depositor would deposit 20oz of gold with a bank, they 
would be given a deposit certificate for 20oz of gold which they could use to claim 20oz from 
that bank when they chose. These certificates could be, and historically were, exchanged 
between private citizens meaning that those who held the deposit certificates could demand the 
amount deposited from the bank at any time even if they themselves were not the original 
depositors of the gold. Today, deposit certificates take on numerous forms. One widely-known 
example is that of the chequing account. Depositors are able exchange “certificates” to the right 
 
2As of March 2020, the minimum reserve ratio in the U.S. is 0%, 1% in the Eurozone, and in Canada no such 
minimum reserve ratio exists 
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to claim money deposited by swiping their debit card or they can actually ask for deposited 
money by using an ATM, exchanging their deposit certificates, which in this case is an amount 
of available funds in a digital chequing account, for actual money which they gain from the 
ATM. For example, if someone has $100 in their chequing account, this represents deposit 
certificates in for the amount of $100 which they can ask to have delivered to them at any time. 
If they use an ATM to take out $100 cash, they demand the amount deposited right then. Or, they 
can use their debit card to exchange the deposit certificates to a merchant, transferring the 
deposit certificates to the merchant by swiping their card, which the merchant can now use to 
have the deposited money delivered to them at any time. For example, $5 of deposit certificates 
can be exchanged for an apple and the merchant can now use those deposit certificates to claim 
$5 of money that is in the bank. No matter the medium, what a deposit certificate stipulates is 
that the holder can claim the amount of money specified by the certificate from the bank which 
holds the money at any time. 
 The lending of deposited money by the bank can take one of two forms. In the first case, 
the bank simply takes money which has been deposited and gives it to borrowers. The borrowers 
are then free to use the money however they please but must repay the loan and its associated 
interest at the date which the loan becomes due. The second way in which the bank can lend the 
money to borrowers is by the creation of additional deposit certificates that are held, not by 
depositors, but by borrowers. For example, a bank may decide to create a line of credit for the 
borrower who, at any time, may demand some amount of money from the bank knowing that 
they, the borrower, will have to pay interest to the bank on money they have taken. In this way, 
the borrower has a similar relationship the bank as the depositor. The borrower may ask for 
money from the bank whenever he desires. The difference is that the borrower pays the bank 
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interest for the right to use the money they take out, whereas in the case of the depositor holding 
deposit certificates, the bank pay the depositor for the right to the use of the money deposited.  
  Fractional-reserve banking can be contrasted with 100% reserve banking. In this case, 
the bank keeps all of the deposited money on hand for the depositor to access. The bank also 
refrains from the creation of demand deposits in excess of the amount of money held by the bank 
which means that all demand deposits would be held by depositors or by those whom the 
depositors had exchanged them with. So, if a bank held $1,000,000 in their reserves, this would 
mean that exactly $1,000,000 in deposit certificates would be held by depositors, no more. This 
form of banking does not act as a credit intermediary but, instead, acts as a storage facility for 
money deposited. Since the bank would not be able to earn interest on money lent, they would 
not be able to pay their depositors an interest rate for their money deposited. Rather, depositors 
would likely have to pay a storage fee to the bank for holding their money for them. 
 Jesús Huerta de Soto has attempted to describe the nature of contracts within the sphere 
of banking while conceptualizing contracts as an exchange of use-rights. In his book, Money, 
Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles, de Soto describes four different forms of contracts which are 
pertinent to current discussion of the practices of fractional-reserve banking. The first is the 
commodatum contract in “which one person—the lender—entrusts to another—the borrower or 
commodatary—a specific item to be used for free for a certain period of time, at the end of 
which the item must be restored to its owner” (1998/2006, 2). In this case, title to that item is 
transferred to the borrower for the specified period for which the contract stipulates and then title 
is returned to the original owner. The second is the mutuum contract in “which one person –the 
lender—entrusts to another—the borrower or mutuary—a certain quantity of fungible goods, and 
the borrower is obliged, at the end of the specified term, to return an equal quantity of goods of 
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the same type and quality” (1998/2006, 2). Again, in this case, title to the fungible goods is 
transferred to the borrower at the beginning of the borrowing period. The difference, here, is that 
title to different goods is then transferred to the lender at the end of the borrowing period. For 
example, Jones could have a mutuum contract with Smith in which he transfers ten bushels of 
wheat to Smith for three weeks. During those three weeks, Smith is able to consume the wheat, 
sell the wheat, or do anything he pleases with the wheat. Then, at the end of the three weeks, 
Smith must repay Jones any ten bushels of wheat as long as they are of similar quality. This is 
unlike the commodatum contract in which Smith would have to return the specific bushels of 
wheat loaned to him. The third is the regular deposit contract in “which one person—the 
depositor—entrusts to another—the depositary—a moveable good for that person to guard, 
protect, and return at any moment the depositor should ask for it” (1998/2006, 4). In this case, 
there is no transfer of title to the good from depositor to depositary, but instead, remains always 
with the depositor. Thus, the deposited good is always available for the depositor to take when 
he wishes. The fourth is an irregular deposit contract in which is similar to the deposit contract 
but in this case, once deposited, “the goods become indiscernibly mixed with others of the same 
type and quality” (1998/2006, 5). De Soto offers two accounts of how title should be regarded in 
this case: his own, and his student, César Martínez Meseguer’s. De Soto explains that 
““ownership” of the deposited good is transferred [from depositor to depositary] in the case of 
the deposit of fungible goods” (1998/2006, 5). Meseguer’s account of the irregular deposit 
claims that “there is no true transference of ownership, but rather that the concept of ownership 
refers abstractly to the tantundem or quantity of good deposited and as such always remains in 
favor of the depositor and is not transferred” (1998/2006, 5). Regardless of the interpretation, 
what is paramount for de Soto is that “there is always an immediate availability in favor of the 
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depositor” (1998/2006, 6). Thus, de Soto argues that “the essence of the deposit remains 
unchanged and that the irregular deposit fully shares the same fundamental nature of all deposits: 
the custody and safekeeping obligation” (1998/2006, 6). 
The first two forms of contracts, the commodatum and the mutuum, are forms of loan 
contracts. The purpose of the contract is loan of the property from the lender to the borrower. 
The other two forms of contracts, the regular and irregular deposit, are forms of bailment 
contracts. The purpose of the contracts is the safeguarding or protection of the depositor’s 
property by the depositum. Throughout the development of the fractional-reserve banking 
debate, the language has become more precise by distinguishing between two types of loan 
contracts; the commodatum and the mutuum and between two types of bailment contracts; the 
regular deposit and the irregular deposit. Throughout this project various authors refer to 
bailment and loan contracts. In the case of specific goods, a loan contract refers to a 
commodatum and a bailment contract refers to a regular deposit. In the case of fungible goods, a 
loan contract refers to a mutuum and a bailment contract refers to an irregular deposit. 
 The difference between the mutuum and the irregular deposit is that it is not a loan of 
present good in exchange for future goods, but instead, a bailment in which the depositor gives 
his money to the bank for safekeeping. De Soto makes clear that this is the essential difference 
between the two forms of contracts: “The essential legal element in the irregular deposit contract 
is the custody or safekeeping of the money deposited … and it varies greatly from the essential 
purpose of the [mutuum] contract which is the transfer of availability of the loaned food to the 
borrower so he can use it for a period of time” (1998/2006, 17). In his book The Case Against the 
Fed, Rothbard argues that the bank deposit should be considered an irregular deposit, not a 
mutuum. Rothbard argues that deposit of fungible goods was historically recognized as a 
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bailment contract (a contract in which the depositor retains title to the deposited goods, i.e. an 
irregular deposit) between depositor and warehouse keeper. For example, he points to 1860s 
grain elevators who were considered to be committing fraudulent practices when they created 
deposit certificates for grain in excess of the amount of grain that was actually in their 
possession. In this case, the elevators would take in grain from farmers and give them deposit 
certificates which the farmer could return to the elevator and collect the same amount of grain 
they deposited. However, the grain elevators would issue certificates in greater quantities than 
they actually held in the elevator. This practice, of lending grain in their reserves, was viewed as 
fraudulent since the wheat held by the elevators was considered to be held on bail: title to the 
wheat was held by the depositor, not the elevator, and the depositor had the right to ask for their 
grain at any time. Therefore, the elevator had no right to create deposit certificates in greater 
quantity than existed in the elevator since not everyone holding a deposit certificate could collect 
their wheat when they asked for it. 
However, with the deposit of money, there was a different legal interpretation. Instead, 
money deposited with banks was considered a loan contract with title being transferred from the 
depositor to the bank. The first case cited by Rothbard as interpreting the bank deposit as a loan 
is Carr v. Carr (1811) in which “the British judge, Sir William Grant, ruled that since the money 
paid to the bank deposited had been paid generally and not earmarked in a sealed bag (i.e. a 
specific deposit) that the transaction had become a loan rather than a bailment” (Rothbard, 
1994/2015, 42). Then, he points to the 1816 case, Devaynes v. Noble in which Grant insisted, 
against a counsel member, that “money paid into a banker’s becomes immediately part of his 
general assets; he is merely a debtor for the amount” (1816) arguing that a transfer of title from 
depositor to bank did, in fact, occur when the money was deposited. Finally, Rothbard points to 
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the “culminating case” (1994/2015, 42) of Foley v. Hill and Others (1848) in which Lord 
Cottenham offers the following ruling: 
The money placed in the custody of a banker is, to all intents and purposes, the 
money of the banker, to do with it as he pleases; he is guilty of no breach, of trust 
in employing it; he is not answerable to the principal if he puts it into jeopardy, if 
he engages in a hazardous speculation; he is not bound to keep it or deal with it as 
the property of his principal, but he is of course answerable for the amount, because 
he has contracted, having received that money, to repay to the principal, when 
demanded, a sum equivalent to that paid into his hands. (1848, 36-37) 
 For Rothbard, what is in order is the treatment of bank deposits (deposits of money) to be 
treated as bailment contracts (irregular deposits) and not as loans (mutuums). The key difference 
is that title to money held on bail remains with the depositor. Thus, the banker has no right to the 
use of the property which goes beyond guarding or safekeeping the money. This mean that they 
have no right to consume the money (for example, by burning it), exchange it for other goods, or 
to loan the money out. Contrast this to the mutuum contract in which title is transferred from 
lender (depositor) to the borrower (bank) which would give the borrower the right to use the 
money how they see fit given only that they return the money once it comes due. If it is the case 
that the bank has no right to use the money in any way other that guarding it (i.e. the money is 
held as an irregular deposit), then the bank must keep all deposited funds on hand since any other 
use of the money would be a violation of the depositor’s property right over the money. 
Rothbardians argue that since depositors have the right at any time to demand money deposited, 
it is tantamount to them having never transferred title to the banks in the first place. Rather, 
depositors retain title to the money deposited and the banks merely act as warehouses for the 
safeguarding of deposited money. This would be the 100% reserve model described above. And 
thus, the Rothbardians argue for such a model of 100% reserve banking and hold that fractional-
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reserve banking is fraudulent. It is this question which will be the question of concern in this 
project. 
The Fractional-Reserve Banking Controversy 
 
 While criticisms of fractional-reserve banking can be seen at least as early as the late 
nineteenth century,3 the debate between fractional-reserve banking’s legitimacy when viewed 
through the lens of the title-transfer theory of contract, has largely been between two schools of 
thought. The first are the “Rothbardians” who oppose fractional-reserve banking and advocate a 
100% reserve banking system. The others are the “Free Bankers” who do not oppose fractional-
reserve banking and consider it to be legitimate.4 The debate has been ongoing for over half a 
century now with the first serious criticism from the Rothbardians coming in 1962 with the 
publication of Rothbard’s The Case for a 100 Percent Gold Dollar in which Rothbard declares 
unequivocally, “In my view, issuing promises to pay on demand in excess of the amount of 
goods on hand is simply fraud and, and should be so considered by the legal system” (44). Since 
then, the debate has led to a great deal of literature and in 2008 Walter Block, a Rothbardian, and 
Lawrence White, a Free Banker, compiled a list of thirty-seven publications on the debate.5 
 One argument that has been posited by the Rothbardians is that fractional-reserve 
banking is fraudulent because depositors are unaware of the fact that money they deposit in the 
bank is being lent out. Hoppe writes that “few if any” (1994, 70) depositors are aware that their 
money is being lent out. This is an important criticism, for if it is true that depositors themselves 
 
3 See Jevons, W. Stanley. 1875. Money and the Mechanisms of Exchange, 15th ed. London: Kegan Paul, p. 206-216 
4 It should be noted that both schools of thought oppose central banks who can act as a ‘lender of last resort’ to the 
banks by printing more money if they are unable to meet the demands for money by those holding demand deposits. 
For this project, we will put aside the problems that are created by a central bank and assume that any banking 
practices would occur without a central bank. 
5 See Block, Walter. 2008. "The Danger of Fractional-Reserve Banking." LewRockwell.com. November 1. 
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believed that their money was being held for safekeeping and not being lent out, then it would 
appear that the depositors, at least, believed that they were entering into a bailment or irregular 
deposit contract, not a loan or mutuum contract. 
In response, the Free Bankers point out that whether or not depositors are aware of the 
fact that the money deposited is being lent out is an empirical question whose answer is the 
opposite of the one provided by Hoppe. George Selgin and Lawrence White argue that they “find 
it hard to believe that most people who patronize fractional-reserve banks do so under the 
delusion that 100 percent of the money they deposit remains in the bank's vault until the moment 
they ask for it back” (1996, 87-88). For them, the fact that depositors receive interest, which as 
even Hoppe admits would not occur if deposited money was not being lent out, should be 
enough for depositors to realize that the deposited money is being lent out. In fact, as Selgin and 
White point out, Rothbard himself has written that “[i]t is well known that banks have rarely 
stayed on a ‘100 percent’ basis very long” (1963/2015, 40). It is also pointed out by White and 
Selgin that many deposit contracts explicity noted either that money deposited was being lent out 
or included clauses allowing banks to suspend payment of money deposited for a certain period 
of time. Selgin and White offer the example of “[t]he Scottish banks that issued option clause 
notes explicitly reserved the right to defer redemption for a specified period, in which case the 
note would be repaid with a specified (and high) interest bonus” (1996, 89). For this project, I 
will set aside this empirical question and, instead, focus on the following two criticisms of 
fractional-reserve banking raised by the Rothbardians. 
Another argument made by the Rothbardians is that the fractional-reserve banking model 
“must be regarded as inherently bankrupt” (Hoppe, 1994, 69). Hoppe argues that this is because 
the bank cannot meet all of its contractual obligations since it could not theoretically stand a 
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bank run in which all depositors asked to have the money they deposited back at once. It 
certainly is the case that banks that operate on a fractional-reserve basis cannot stand a bank run 
but, as I will argue later on, this does not mean that banks cannot meet all of their contractual 
obligations, but instead, that there is a possibility that they might not meet their contractual 
obligations. Rothbard makes clear this criticism with a proposed example of the “Rothbard 
Deposit Bank” (1994/2015, 47) who creates demand deposits for borrowers which far exceeds 
the amount of money held by the bank from depositors: “Suppose that the Rothbard Deposit 
Bank, previously hewing to 100-percent reserves, decides to make a quick killing and go all out: 
upon a cash reserve of $20,000, previously banking receipts of $20,000, it decides to print 
unbacked warehouse receipts of $1,000,000, lending them out at interest to various borrowers” 
(1994/2015, 51). In this case, Rothbard argues that the bank may continue operations unimpeded 
but only until a depositor demands the money in a greater quantity than what is actually held by 
the bank. “Suppose, for example, that [someone holding the warehouse receipts] … presents the 
receipt for $1 million to the Rothbard Bank and demands redemption. What happens? The 
Rothbard Bank, of course, has peanuts, or more precisely, $20,000. It is immediately insolvent 
and out of business” (1994/2015, 52) Thus, for the Rothbardians, the practice of issuing receipts 
for money in excess of the amount of money actually held by the bank is fraudulent as it shows 
that the bank is inherently bankrupt and cannot meet its contractual obligations to redeem those 
warehouse receipts. 
The important distinction here is, again, whether or not money deposited in a bank 
represents a loan or a bailment contract. If the money deposited is the property of the depositor, 
then the money truly is owed to them now. That is to say that the depositor, having title to the 
money, is currently owed the money since the bank never had title of the money to begin with. 
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They could not have met their obligations to the depositor since their obligation was to safeguard 
the money, not to lend it out. In contrast, if a bank deposit can be viewed as a loan, then it is 
entirely possible for banks to meet all of their contractual obligations. In this case, the loan 
becomes “due” when the depositor asks for their money back. Therefore, the only contractual 
obligation that is owed to the depositor is that they gain title to the money upon asking for it. As 
long as banks return money to depositors when it was asked for, then no contractual obligations 
were not met. As an empirical fact, Selgin argues that “genuine banking crises have been rare in 
most well-studied fractional-reserve banking systems and entirely absent in several” (1994, 595) 
noting that several countries including Canada, Scotland, and Sweden would go decades on end 
without failing to return money to depositors when it was demanded (1994, 597). Thus, if it is 
the case that bank deposits represent a loan, as I will argue it is, then it is not impossible for 
banks to meet their contractual obligations, but rather, we can see from empirical evidence that 
banks can and have met these obligations for decades on end. 
 A third argument against the legitimacy of fractional-reserve banking brought up by the 
Rothbardians is that fractional-reserve banking creates double-title to the same piece of property. 
By this they mean that when the bank loans out deposited money to borrowers, it is saying that 
both the depositor and the borrower have title to the same piece of property, namely, the money 
deposited. Consider the above-mentioned rule that unrestricted title to the same piece of property 
cannot be attributed to more than one person at a time. The reason for this is that it creates a 
conflict of rights in that both parties would have the right to use the property in any way they see 
fit, including ways which might conflict with each other. In the case of deposited money, what 
the bank is saying is that the depositor has the right to use the money in any way they please and 
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so does the borrower. This means that the depositor has the right to spend the money on a new 
car and the borrower has the right to spend the money on a new laptop, a conflict of rights. 
Again, though, this account of fractional-reserve banking is only correct if money 
deposited is truly a bailment, not a loan. Consider the Free Banker account of what is happening 
to the title of the money as it moves from depositor to bank to borrower. When the depositor 
deposits their money in a bank, they are transferring title to that money from themselves to the 
bank. What the bank gives up in exchange for title to the money is the right of the depositor to 
gain title to the same amount of money (but not the exact same bills they deposited) when they 
ask for it, from the bank. Then, the bank transfers title of that money to the borrower, who, in 
exchange, gives up title to some amount of money greater than the sum borrowed (the principal 
plus interest) in the future. In this account of the bank deposit and subsequent lending of money 
deposited, there are no conflicting rights to the money at any time. Once the money has been 
deposited, the bank gains title to the money and the depositor loses it. Once the money has been 
lent out to the borrower, the borrower gains title to the money and the bank loses it. At no time 
does more than one person have title to the same piece of property. 
The Rothbardians, however, argue that this account is simply not plausible. In giving the 
depositor the right to take the same amount of money deposited from the bank at any time, it is 
the same as the depositor retaining title. As Block and William Barnett write, “A deposits $10 in 
bank B on demand. This is not a time deposit, but rather a demand deposit. The length of “time” 
for this demand deposit is 0 years, 0 months, 0 weeks, 0 days, 0 minutes and 0 seconds” (2017, 
54). Thus, for the Rothbardians, a bank deposit does not constitute a transfer of title from the 
depositor to the bank. Rather, the depositor always retains title to the property. 
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If this is the case, then upon the bank lending out the money they hold from depositors, 
they would, in fact, be creating a dual title to the same piece of property. This, charges Block, 
amounts to fraud as it is selling that which is impossible: two people having conflicting rights 
over the same piece of property. It is not possible for the depositor to spend the money on wheat 
and the borrower to spend the money on beef, two rights which would be assigned if both 
depositor and borrower had title to the same money. So, for the Rothbardians, such a contract 
that stipulated this would be the same as selling magic beans. As Hoppe, Block, and Jörg Guido 
Hülsmann argue, “agreements regarding flying elephants, centaurs, squared circles, of perpetui 
mobile, for instance, are invalid contracts. They cannot—by virtue of biological physical, or 
mathematical law—be fulfilled, and are from the outset false and fraudulent” (1998, 26). This is 
the same status they attribute bank deposits being recognized as loans: it is selling the impossible 
and therefore fraudulent. 
The Free Bankers, however, argue that such a contract is not impossible but take on the 
form of what we commonly call “callable loans” (White, 2007) or call loans. A call loan is 
similar to a regular loan insofar as there is a lender, who lends money out at a specified interest 
rate to a borrower. The difference is that whereas the normal loan has a specified end date at 
which the borrower must return the amount borrowed, the call loan is due back to the lender the 
day the lender asks for it. The call loan can have its due date be only the date that the lender asks 
for their money back or it can have a specified due date with the option for the lender to ask for 
the money returned before that date. The Free Bankers, therefore, argue that if viewed as a call 
loan, the bank deposit does not fall into the trap of having two people with title to the same 
money at the same time. In this case, title to the money is transferred from the depositor to the 
bank from the date of the deposit, until the depositor asks for the money returned, in which case 
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title to the same amount of money deposited is transferred from the bank, to the depositor. 
During the time which the bank has title to the money, it can do as it please with that money 
including, most importantly, lending the money out. As long as the bank returns the proper 
amount of money to the depositor when the depositor demands, the bank has never created a 
double-title to the same piece of property. 
The aim of this project is to show the legitimacy of the call loan under the title-transfer 
theory of contract and show that when bank deposits are viewed through this lens, both the 
charge of inherent bankruptcy and the fraudulent creation of two titles to the same piece of 
property, are no longer valid. In order to do this, I will draw on contractual practices within other 
industries such as insurance which will offer us insight into the way that we can think about title 
to property that is contingent upon some action happening: In the case of insurance, say fire 
insurance, title to money is dependent upon a fire occurring and in the case of the bank deposit, a 
form of call loan, title to money is dependent upon the depositor asking for the return of money 
deposited. In this way, we can also use actuarial practices within the insurance industry to show 
how banks can manage risk in a similar way as insurance companies do, deciding the amount of 
cash they should hold depending on the risk of the depositors asking for deposited money in the 
same way insurance companies decide the amount of cash they should hold depending on the 




Chapter 2 – The Call Loan View of Bank Deposits 
 
In the first chapter, we explored how the title-transfer theory of contract has given rise to 
debate surrounding the legitimacy of fractional-reserve banking. Rothbardians have asserted that 
an understanding of property rights as a bundle of use-rights precludes the possibility of two 
people having title to the same resource at the same time. In this chapter, I will explain in detail 
how Rothbardians have purported that this double-title to property arises within the practice of 
fractional-reserve banking. Then, I will offer a view of bank deposits as call loans in which such 
double-title to property never arises as all. 
In his 1994 book, The Case Against the Fed, Rothbard writes, 
Once our banker begins his career of crime, there are several things he must worry 
about. In the first place, he must worry that if he is caught out, he might go to jail 
and endure heavy fines as an embezzler. It becomes important for him to hire legal 
counsel, economists, and financial writers to convince the courts and the public that 
his fractional-reserve actions are certainly not fraud and embezzlement, that they 
are merely legitimate entrepreneurial actions and voluntary contracts. And that 
therefore if someone should present a receipt promising redemption in gold or cash 
on demand, and if the banker cannot pay, that this is merely an unfortunate 
entrepreneurial failure rather than the uncovering of a criminal act. To get away 
with this line of argument, he has to convince the authorities that his deposit 
liabilities are not a bailment, like a warehouse, but merely good-faith debt. If the 
banker can convince people of his trickery, then he has greatly widened the 
temptation and the opportunity he enjoys, for practicing fractional-reserve 
embezzlement. (41) 
It is my aim in this project to attempt just such trickery and argue that bank deposits can be 
viewed as good-faith loans instead of bailments. In this chapter, I am going to give an account of 
the bank deposit as a call loan. With this account of the bank deposit, I will proceed by arguing 
that the call loan, properly understood under the title-transfer theory of contract, can be 
recognized as a transfer of title to money from lender to borrower with a   conditional transfer of 
title to money from borrower to lender in the future upon the lender demanding the money. Then, 
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I will show that this account of bank deposits as call loans a double-title to property, which 
Rothbardians claim renders fractional-reserve banking illegitimate, never arises. Then, I will 
present an account of standard banking practices with bank deposits viewed as call loans. 
Other Considerations in the Fractional-Reserve Banking Debate 
 
Within the debate between Rothbardians and Free Bankers over the legitimacy of 
fractional-reserve banking there has arisen a multitude of questions surrounding what role 
fractional-reserve banking might take within society. Some have argued that people are unaware 
that they are entering into loan contracts with banks and think that they are entering into bailment 
contracts. Others have argued that even if fractional-reserve banking could be considered 
legitimate, there would not be demand for its services. Below, I have outlined how these debates 
have arisen within the fractional-reserve banking debate and explain why they are outside the 
scope of this project. 
The following is an example of clear and unambiguous fraud under the title-transfer 
theory of contract: A agrees to pay B $100 a month. In exchange, B will hold A’s television for 
safekeeping and protections against the elements as well as human thieves and vandals. B, 
instead of holding onto A’s television, lends the television out to his friends on weekends, uses 
the television at his own apartment on weekdays. Here, fraud has clearly taken place. B has 
failed to uphold a voluntarily agreed upon contract and B has therefore implicitly stolen from A, 
in this case, in two ways. In the first way, B stole from A by taking his money as the transfer of 
title of the monthly $100 from A to B was contingent upon the safekeeping and protection of A’s 
television. Since he did not safekeep or protect it, but rather used it and lent it out, B has stolen 
$100 a month that should never have been transferred to him in the first place. In the second 
way, B has defrauded A out of his television. When A transferred title to his television to B it 
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was an example of restricted title. B gained the right to guard, protect, or safekeep the television. 
This may include placing it in a secure warehouse, moving it from one storage location to 
another, inspecting it for possible damage. But it does not include the right to use the television 
himself or lend out the television to his friends. Thus, these uninvited uses of A’s property by B 
are implicit theft and fraudulent. 
Here, we have a case of a regular deposit, as described above, being made. The 
depositum does not have the right to do with the deposited goods as they please but must keep 
the property for safekeeping and protection. If both parties agree to a deposit contract, any use of 
the property outside of these activities (safekeeping and protection) are illegitimate and 
fraudulent. For this project, however, these clearly fraudulent activities are not our focus. 
Instead, this project will explore the possibility of creating contracts that both parties understand 
and consent to which would allow for fractional-reserve banking to be viewed as legitimate 
under the title-transfer theory of contract. 
Also, it may the case that in a society with strict respect for property rights and the title-
transfer theory of contract that fractional-reserve banking may not emerge, even if such business 
practices were legitimate. This may be from inherent characteristics of the fractional-reserve 
banking system that would make it difficult to long-operate on a fractional-reserve basis. As 
Hülsmann argues, “in a free market with proper product differentiation, fractional-reserve 
banking would play virtually no monetary role.” (2003, 403).  For example, it is pointed out by 
Rothbardians that if one bank operating on a 100% reserve basis acquired deposit certificates 
from a fractional-reserve bank in excess of the amount of money held by fractional-reserve bank 
(e.g. the 100% reserve bank holds $1,000,100 “worth” of deposit certificates from a fractional-
reserve bank which holds only $1,000,000 in cash), it would be in the interest of the 100% 
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reserve bank to present the deposit certificates for redemption at the fractional reserve banks. 
This would bankrupt the fractional-reserve bank since they would have insufficient funds to pay 
out the demanded money. The Rothbardians, therefore, claim that fractional-reserve banking in 
inherently unstable. It is also possible that fractional-reserve banking may not emerge in a 
society with strict adherence to the right of property and title-transfer theory of contract due to 
the public’s distaste for fractional-reserve banking. Perhaps consumers prefer to pay a storage fee 
for 100% reserve banks than be paid an interest and take any perceived risk that comes along 
from fractional-reserve banking and refuse to solicit fractional-reserve banks. Or, the public may 
prefer to trade in deposit certificates by banks with 100% reserves since they would much more 
closely represent money substitutes than deposit certificates from fractional-reserve banks. As 
Hülsmann argues, “The fractional-reserve [deposit certificates] would be traded in rather narrow 
circles of merchants and bankers, whereas the overwhelming majority of the population would 
pay in cash or with genuine money titles” (2003, 403). However, this is, again, not a question 
which I will consider in this project. The question of if fractional-reserve banking will emerge 
within a system with strict adherence to the right of property and the title-transfer theory is set 
aside.6 
Again, we want to consider whether it is possible for two voluntary participants of a 
contract to create a loan in which the lender can ask for the principal of their loan back at any 
time which is compatible with the title-transfer theory of contract. Thus, the aim of this project is 
to determine whether or not such a contract can be considered legitimate under the title-transfer 
 
6 Our contemporary world cannot definitively tell us whether people would solicit fractional-reserve banks in a 
society that adheres to the right of property and contract since central banks and public deposit insurance agencies 
make banking with fractional reserve banks less risky than they would otherwise be. Thus, the empirical question of 
whether or not people would solicit fractional-reserve banks without a central bank or public deposit insurance 
agency is put aside for this project. 
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theory of contract. And, if so, if there are legitimate ways in which fractional reserve banking 
can operate using them i.e. can a bank deposit contract take this form. This form of loan has been 
called by Free Bankers a “callable loan” (White, 2007), which refers to what is commonly 
known as a call loan. Thus, I will herein be using the term “call loan” to describe this form of 
loan. 
The Loan and the Call Loan 
 
 Under the title-transfer theory of contract, a standard loan contract takes the following 
form: Party A agrees to transfer title to some amount of money today, known as the principal, to 
party B. In exchange, party B agrees to transfer some amount of money, greater than the 
principal, in the future. The difference between the principal and the amount of money 
transferred to party A in the future is known as the interest and the date in the future in which B 
transfers money to B is known as the maturity date. Here is an example of a loan contract under 
the title-transfer theory of contract: Jones and Smith set up a loan contract on January 1, 2020. 
On January 1, 2020, Jones transfers $100 to Smith for one year, making the maturity date 
January 1, 2021 with an interest rate of 10%. Upon agreeing to the contract, Smith is now bound 
to transfer $110 ($100 + 10% interest) to Jones on January 1, 2021. As long as both parties 
deliver the proper amount of money on the proper dates, then no fraud has occurred, and the 
terms of the contract are fulfilled.7 
 The call loan separates itself from the ordinary loan in only one way. While there may be 
a specified maturity date, the lender is able to ask for the principal to be transferred to them at 
any time. The following is an example of the call loan under the title-transfer theory of contract: 
 
7 The Rothbardian view of property and contract would posit that any interest rate is justifiable. However, we will 
set aside the question of just interest rates and usury for the purposes of this project. 
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Jones and Smith set up a call loan contract on January 1, 2020. On January 1, 2020, Jones 
transfers $100 to Smith for one year with a specified maturity date of January 1, 2021 and 
interest rate of 10%. However, Jones retains the right to call the loan at any time and have the 
principal amount, $100, transferred to him at any time. Now, on July 1, 2020, Jones calls the 
loan and has the $100 transferred to him immediately. Now, as long as Jones delivers $100 to 
Smith on January 1, 2020, and Smith delivers $100 to Jones on July 1, 2020, then no fraud has 
taken place and the terms of the deal are fulfilled. 
 The call loan can have different stipulations in the contract regarding what is to happen 
with the interest. For example, the contract may stipulate that in the case that the lender calls 
their loan before the maturity date, the lender is owed no interest, only the principal. In this case, 
all that is required from the borrower upon the lender calling their loan, is that they deliver the 
principal amount to the lender on the day it is called. The contract may stipulate, instead, that the 
lender is owed the interest that would have been received had the maturity date been set to the 
call-date, the date and which the lender called their loan. In the case of Smith and Jones above, 
this would mean that Smith would have to deliver $105 ($100 + 10%/2) to Jones on July 1, 2020, 
since six months had passed. But the contract may also stipulate that the lender is owed a half or 
a quarter of the interest they would have received. Contractors can decide any such stipulations 
in their contract regarding what is owed on the call date.8 The key element of the call loan is that 
the lender can ask for the principal amount of money back at any time. 
 What does this mean regarding the transfer of title? The call loan has the special 
characteristic of giving the lender the right to demand the money lent at any time. As we will see, 
 
8 The contractors may, for example, decide that if the lender calls their loan on a day in which it is raining, they are 
owed half of their earned interest whereas if the lender calls their loan on an exclusively sunny day, they may only 
be entitled to a quarter of the accumulated interest. 
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some authors have argued that this amounts to the lender never giving up title to the money at 
all. This is an important consideration because if no transfer of title from lender to borrower 
occurs, then the borrower does not have the standard rights associated with unrestricted title, to 
use the money how they please, most importantly, the right to lend the money out. What I will 
argue in the following section is that in the case of the call loan, title is transferred on the first 
day of the contract from the lender to the borrower. This means that the borrower can do 
anything they want with the money provided only that they do not violate the property rights of 
others. Then, upon the earliest of either the calling of the loan or the maturity date, an amount of 
money equal to the principal amount is transferred from the borrower to the lender plus any 
interest that was stipulated in the contract. In this way, there are clear and distinct dates at which 
title to the money is transferred from the lender to the borrower and then from the borrower to 
the lender. Thus, the loan becomes due either at the earliest of the date the loan is called or its 
maturity date. 
 In his 2007 article, “Huerta de Soto’s Case Against Fractional Reserves” claims that 
“[t]he common checking account is (at least to all appearances) a type of callable loan where the 
lender is the account-holder and the borrower is the bank” (2007).  This means that when a 
depositor is making a bank deposit, they are making a call loan to the bank. This seems 
linguistically strange since we call a bank deposit a “deposit”. However, as White points out, this 
is the way in which bank deposits do operate today under fractional-reserve regimes. Depositors 
are able to demand money that they “deposited” (or rather, lent) at any time while still giving 
license to banks to use the money how they please until that time when they do demand it. 
Below, I will explain how this conceptual understanding of the contract that is made between 
depositor and bank allows us to understand who and when each party gains or loses title to 
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money that is deposited and how it can overcome some important criticisms of fractional-reserve 
banking that are posited by the Rothbardians. 
Is the Call Loan a Loan at All? 
 
One criticism of the call loan made by the Rothbardians is that the call loan must be 
considered a deposit (a bailment) and not a loan since there needs to be immediate, guaranteed 
availability of the funds loaned for the lender to claim at any time. Thus, for the Rothbardians, a 
call loan does not represent a transfer of title from lender to borrower, but rather, the “lender” (or 
depositor) retains title to the item lent and the “borrower” (or depositum) has only the right to 
use the item lent (or deposited) insofar as it achieves the goal of safekeeping and protection. The 
reason for this, according to Block and Barnett, is that the call loan has no due date in which the 
borrower must return the borrowed funds to the lender. Again, as Block and Barnett write, “A 
deposits $10 in bank B on demand. This is not a time deposit, but rather a demand deposit. The 
length of “time” for this demand deposit is 0 years, 0 months, 0 weeks, 0 days, 0 minutes and 0 
seconds” (2017, 54). Thus, for Block and Barnett, the call loan is due immediately effectively 
saying that the “lender” never lent their money out at all and thus the demand deposit does not 
constitute a loan. Therefore, any lending of money which was borrowed on a call loan would be 
equivalent to lending out money which was properly owed to a different party today. It is the 
equivalent to lending out money that belongs to someone else. 
However, I will argue in this chapter, the call loan can be appropriately viewed as being 
owed to the lender when they demand it, and not, as Block and Barnett argue, immediately. 
Through this lens, I will show that it is possible to consider the call loan an unrestricted transfer 
of title to the piece of property lent from lender to borrower. This is followed by a transfer of title 
to that property from the borrower back to the lender upon the lender asking for the principal of 
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their loan back. If viewed in this way, the borrower of money on a call loan would have the right 
to use the property in any way they saw fit between the time the money was lent, and when it 
was asked to be returned by the lender. This would include the right to spend the money, destroy 
it, lend it out, or anything else that the borrower wishes, only insofar as they do not use it to 
violate the property rights of others.  
 Let us consider the difference between the demand deposit and the time deposit. The 
demand deposit, as stated above, allows the depositor to demand the principal deposited at any 
time. The time deposit, on the other hand, takes the form of the standard loan described above: 
one party deposits money and can only redeem it at a prespecified date in the future. As Barnett 
and Block state, “all time deposits, no matter how long the term to maturity at issuance, 
eventually reach maturity. Right before that point, they are still time deposits, but with 
exceedingly short time durations left until maturity” (2005, 67). The demand deposit, for Barnett 
and Block, then, is due immediately to the depositor. As Block writes in his 1988 essay, 
“Fractional Reserve Banking: An Interdisciplinary Perspective”, “A demand deposit is just that: 
an amount of money placed with the bank which, according to the contract, the bank has agreed 
to pay back on demand, forthwith, immediately” (27). It should be noted that Block equates “on 
demand” (1988, 27), and “immediately” (1988, 27) i.e. that money that can be demanded by 
someone is the same as money that is owed to them immediately. “On demand” for Block means 
that the entire time that money is held by bankers, it is “due” to the depositor. From the second 
that the depositor makes the deposit, until the time of them actually demanding money deposited, 
the bank constantly owes the money to the depositor. Thus, for Block, there is no differentiation 
between what is due “when demanded” and what is due “now”. For Block, a call loan which 
gives the lender the option to demand money lent at any time does not properly represent a loan 
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since money lent/deposited is at all times due to the lender/depositor. Thus, money lent by 
depositors in a demand deposit transfers title from depositor to depositum for zero time, i.e. not 
at all, and therefore does not constitute a loan. 
 It is this view which this project will aim to reject. Instead of considering demand 
deposits as being due immediately, I will argue that, completely in line with the Rothbardian 
view of property and the title-transfer theory of contract, the money lent to the bank can be 
viewed as due the instant that its return is demanded by the depositor. In this way, we can see 
that the call loan does involve the transfer of title of money deposited from depositor to 
depositum for a period of time. That period of time is the time between the deposit at the 
depositor demanding the money deposited. Thus, the call loan can properly represent a loan 
contract in which title to present goods, money deposited, can be exchanged for interest on the 
money lent. 
 The call loan, as I have previously stated, can take on various forms and stipulations 
regarding a maturity date, interest earned, and penalties for calling the loan before its maturity 
date. Below, I will sketch out a call loan which most closely resembles that of a standard demand 
deposit we are familiar with today. The following is a description of that call loan under the title-
transfer theory of contract: 
The lender lends some amount of money, the principal, to the borrower. The instant that 
this contract is initiated, unrestricted title to the principal is transferred from the lender to the 
borrower. Interest may be earned on the money lent and is compounded at standard periodic 
intervals. Interest earned is added to the principle as it compounds. The principal plus earned 
interest is the balance. Title to the balance remains with the borrower. Title to any portion of the 
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balance is transferred from the borrower to the lender upon the lender demanding it, or “calling” 
the loan. 
 The important characteristic of this account of the call loan, is that title to money is 
transferred conditionally from the borrower to the lender upon the lender calling the loan. I will 
show that conditional transfer of title is perfectly permissible under the title-transfer theory of 
contract. As I will show, there are numerous instances of ordinary contracts which involve the 
transfer of title which is conditional upon some event occurring. The first example I offer is that 
of fire insurance. The purchase of fire insurance involves a transfer of title to money from the 
insured to the insurer each month known as a premium. In exchange for this payment, insurance 
companies agree that, in the event of a fire breaking out in the policy-holder’s house, the 
insurance company will pay to have the damages repaired or to replace items that cannot be 
repaired up to some maximum monetary amount. This transfer of title, however, is in exchange 
for the future conditional transfer of title to money in the future. That condition is that the 
insured’s house actually catches on fire. Consider the following example: a consumer purchases 
fire $1,000,000 in fire insurance, agreeing to pay $500 every month as a premium. The terms of 
the contract are as such: title to $500 is transferred from the consumer to the insurance company 
at the end of each month and, if the consumer’s house catches on fire, title to $1,000,000 is 
transferred from the insurance company to the consumer. So, until an actual fire occurs, title to 
the $1,000,000 is properly held by the insurance company. Since a fire can occur at any time, 
would we say that the consumer had title to the $1,000,000 prior to the fire occurring? No, it is 
only upon the actual occurrence of a fire that the title to that $1,000,000 is transferred to 
consumer. And here we can see a clear-cut case in which it is acceptable, under the title-transfer 
theory of contract to have transfers of title which are conditional upon some event occurring. 
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 One may object that this account of conditional transfers of title differ from the call loan 
since it is not the actions of human actors who are privy to the contract which determines when 
title is transferred. But there are other instances in which we can see that human actions can be 
seen as permissible conditions for the transfer of title to property. Rothbard endorsed such a 
possibility in his example of an actor who agrees to show up to a theatre on a particular date 
(1982/2002, 137-138). In order to protect the theatre owner in the event that the actor does not 
arrive, the actor agrees to pay a penal bond which stipulates that the actor must transfer 
$1,000,000 to the theatre owner upon the actor not appearing at the theatre on the specified date. 
In this case, title to $1,000,000 is transferred from the actor to the theatre owner upon the actor 
using his own physical body to locate himself in any place which is not the theatre. It is only then 
that the theatre owner gains title to the agreed upon $1,000,000. Again, would we say that prior 
to the actor not arriving at the theatre, the theatre owner had title to the $1,000,000? No, again, it 
is only upon the actor being somewhere which is not the theatre that the theatre owner gains title 
to the $1,000,000. Thus, there is no reason to reject the possibility of conditional transfers of title 
to property that depend upon the actions of human actors privy to the contract.  
 However, one might argue further that the call loan is different in that one party can have 
title to property transferred to themselves by their actions alone. In the case of the actor and the 
theatre, the actor’s actions could only relieve him of title to property, it could not gain him title to 
property. But is there any reason to believe that contracts in which one can gain title to property 
from their own actions alone? Consider the following example: A farmer who is plagued by 
gophers ruining their crops agrees to pay a local hunter to exterminate the gophers. Since neither 
the farmer nor the hunter are sure of the scale of the problem they come up with the following 
solution: The farmer will pay the hunter for 5¢ for every gopher the hunter kills. They enter into 
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this contract in which title to the 5¢ is conditional upon the hunter’s actions of killing the gopher. 
There is no reason why such a contract could not be viewed as legitimate and that the hunter is 
legitimately owed 5¢ every time he kills a gopher.9 Once again, since the hunter has the ability to 
gain title to property, the 5¢, by his own actions, should we suppose that the hunter had title to 
the 5¢ prior to his actually killing of the gopher? Again, no, it was only upon the killing of the 
gopher, an action of the hunter, that the farmer owed the 5¢ to the hunter. It was only upon the 
killing of the gopher that the hunter gained title to the 5¢. Until that point, title to the 5¢ was still 
properly held by the farmer. 
 The same case can be applied to the case of the call loan. Title can transfer upon the 
actions of the lender calling their loan. It is not necessarily the case that because some action 
taken by the lender can transfer title to money to himself that he is the owner of the money prior 
to that action being taken. Thus, in the case of the call loan, title can be said to be held by the 
borrower up until the lender calls their loan and title to the money is transferred upon the lender 
doing so. Thus, money does not become ‘due’ to the lender until the lender asks for it. 
Contrast this to Block’s view of the call loan which holds that since the lender can gain 
title to the money by simply asking, then title to the money is held by the lender the entire time. 
But is there good reason to accept Block’s view? Just as in the case of the gopher hunter who 
must kill gophers in order to gain title to money, the lender must similarly commit some action in 
order to have title to the money transferred to them. The lender must use their voice, or pen and 
paper, or email to ask for their money back. Or, they must write and sign a cheque. Or, they must 
 
9 There may be a limit upon the number of gophers that the farmer must pay for. This limit may appear in the 
original contract between the farmer and the hunter such as a clause that states the limit the farmer will pay that 
particular hunter. For example, “I will pay 5¢ for every gopher up to 100 gophers”. Or, it may appear as a general 
clause of the offer presented to the public for hunting the gophers. “While supplies last” disclaimers for online 
orders are an example of just such limiting qualifications on an offer to exchange goods in the future. 
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swipe their debit card to ask to have a part of the balance transferred to a merchant. In any case, 
the transfer of title from to money from the borrower of the call loan to the lender is conditional 
upon some action of the lender. 
 There is one more difference between the hunter example and the call loan which I will 
here address. In the example of the hunter and the farmer, it could be the case that there may be a 
built-in, clause in the contract which would allow the farmer to revoke the open offer to pay the 
farmer 5¢ for every gopher he has killed. However, in the case of the call loan, the borrower has 
no choice to revoke the conditional transfer of title to money to the lender. But this is not a 
problem for the title-transfer theory of contract. There are many instances in which we could see 
a conditional transfer of title as non-revocable by either party. Imagine, for example, that a 
construction company is hired by a university to build a new engineering building for $50,000 on 
September 1, 2020. In this case, title to $50,000 is transferred to the construction company upon 
the completion of the building. However, imagine that the university backs out on August 31 and 
says that they no longer want to pay the money and no longer want the building built. Should the 
university be considered liable for the $50,000? Unless there was a specific stipulation in the 
contract which allowed for this cancellation, then the university is still “on the hook” for the 
money. In this case, there is an irrevocable conditional transfer of title to $50,000 from the 
university to the construction company. The university must pay the money. 
 Finally, this account of the bank deposit as a call loan makes a particular claim about 
which pieces of property title is transferred at which time. When the lender lends money on a call 
loan they do not retain title to that money at all. There is no sense in which title to those 
particular pieces of paper money lent is still held by the lender. Instead, unrestricted title to that 
money is transferred from the lender to the borrower. The borrower, thus, has the right to so 
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whatever they choose to do with the money as long as they don’t infringe on the rights of others 
with that money. This, again, includes the right to exchange the money, destroy the money, 
throw it into the ocean, write your mother a nice note or, most importantly and as will be 
explained in detail below, lend the money out. 
 In one important way, this account of title to money in the case of the call-loan is one that 
is necessary for the creation of contracts which concern the change of possession of fungible 
goods: The depositum or borrower must be given the right to distribute the deposited or lent 
goods to others. In the case of the regular deposit, a deposit of non-fungible, specific goods, one 
can transfer restricted title from the depositor to the depositum; the depositum does not gain full 
title associated with unrestricted title to the specific piece of property deposited. Instead, they 
gain only the right to use the property in ways which aid in the safeguarding and protection of 
that property. Take the above television example. The depositum has the right to move the 
television between warehouses but he does not have the right to use the television to watch 
football during the week. In this case, all other rights are withheld by the depositor. The 
depositor still denies the right to anyone to sell his television, use it to watch football, or 
anything else. He has transferred the right to use the television in ways which safeguard and 
protect it to the depositum. This exchange of title becomes more problematic when we are faced 
with the deposit of fungible goods.  Consider the example of an irregular deposit of oil. 
Remember, that in the case of an irregular deposit “the goods deposited become indiscernibly 
mixed with others of the same type and quality” (de Soto, 1998/2006, 5).10 In this case, it’s not 
clear that the depositor can restrict the right of the depositum to use the oil in the same way he 
 
10 The concerns raised in this paragraph and the next are rendered moot if goods, fungible or otherwise, are not 
mixed with goods from other depositors 
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can with the deposit television. In this case, the depositum has mixed the oil from each depositor 
together. Thus, when a depositor asks to receive their deposited amount of oil, the depositum 
must retrieve that amount from the community pot. Since the oil has been indiscernibly mixed, 
there is no way to tell which oil molecules were deposited by this depositor and which were 
deposited by others. If each depositor withheld the right to give their oil out to other people, then 
this practice would be wholly illegitimate under the title-transfer theory of contract since the 
deposit would inevitably be distributing molecules of oil which he had no right to distribute since 
the right to do so was withheld by the original depositors. Thus, when depositors deposit 
fungible goods which are to become indiscernibly mixed with fungible goods from other 
depositors, they must give the right to distribute their deposited goods to others. 
 One may object that my analysis of fungible goods cannot be correct since it proves far 
too much. It would seem that such an analysis would make it impossible to construct deposit 
contracts of fungible goods in which the depositum would be held to the requirement of 100% 
reserves of those fungible goods i.e. depositors could never create a contract in which they would 
be guaranteed that the depositum would not lend out some of the goods held. But this is not the 
case at all. Patrons could still solicit 100% reserve depositums acting as warehouses for the 
safeguarding of fungible goods. All that would be necessary would be that the restricted title to 
the fungible good (which now includes the right to safeguard the property, protect the property, 
and distribute the goods to others) would transfer from the depositor to the depositum on the 
condition that the depositum did not take goods from the community pot themselves, lend out 
any fungible goods in the community pot or create receipts for fungible goods in excess of the 
amount held in the community pot. In this way, depositums under such contractual restrictions 
would lose the ability to operate at all since the restricted title which gives the depositor the right 
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to safeguard and distribute the goods (uses of the goods which would be essential to the 
operation of the business) would be stripped upon the misuse of any of the goods in their 
possession. Thus, for those who want to solicit only 100% reserve depositums which still having 
the conveniences and lower costs associated with indistinguishably mixing fungible goods from 
different depositors, there can still be contractual guarantees of 100% reserve operations. 
Overcoming the Double-Title to Property Problem 
 
 Now, I will turn to the problem of double-title to property which Rothbardians have 
claimed occurs when fractional-reserve banking is practiced. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, under a substantive view of property, there is no way in which two people could ever 
legitimately come to have unrestricted title to the same piece of property. If two people have title 
to a particular resource then they have the right to do incompatible things with that resource. 
Thus, contracts under a substantive view of property must never create two titles to the same 
resource. The point made by the Rothbardians is an important one which should be taken by 
those who view ownership as conferring rights over the use of some resource by individuals.11 If 
two people have full, unrestricted title to some specific piece of property, then there is a conflict 
of rights regarding the use of that property. Both owners have the right to simultaneously use the 
same piece of property for incompatible (in that they physically cannot be performed 
simultaneously) purposes, say, driving the car east and driving the car west at the same time. 
Thus, if fractional-reserve banking really does require the creation of multiple titles to the same 
piece of property then it must be considered illegitimate. 
 
11 See Block, Walter. 2008. "The Danger of Fractional-Reserve Banking." LewRockwell.com. November 1 in which 
Bryan Caplan erroneously refuses to recognize the problem of conflicting rights that comes with multiple titles to 
the same piece of property. 
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The merits of this view are made even clearer in the case of obviously stolen goods. If a 
thief steals a bicycle from A and attempts to sell the bicycle to B for $100, the thief is guilty of 
two crimes. First, he is guilty of theft from A, but he has also committed fraud against B since he 
has attempted to sell B title to property which the thief has no right to sell. That right is still held 
by A. In attempting to sell title which he did not properly hold, the thief has implicitly stolen 
$100 from B. It is because title to the bicycle was not held by the thief that he has illegitimately 
attempted to sell title which did not exist (i.e. the thief created a title to the bicycle out of thin air 
which he gave to B) and thus created double-title to the same piece of property, one title held by 
A and one by B.12 However, as Block and Barnett point out, this would be the case regardless of 
the “voluntary” nature of the contract. Suppose A said to a bicycle broker that he will allow him 
to lend out his bicycle for B to use. However, A would like to retain unrestricted title to the 
bicycle. How could such a contract be constructed? It could not since any lending of the bicycle 
to B would involve creating conflicting rights over the use of the bicycle. If B was sold the right 
to use the bicycle every weekday and A held unrestricted title to the bicycle, then A would have 
the right to use the bicycle in Toronto on Wednesday and B would have the right to use the 
bicycle in Dubai on Wednesday; two incompatible uses. Suppose that one Wednesday while B 
was riding the bicycle A took the bicycle from B and started riding it himself. As B protests, A 
might respond, “But I never gave up title to this bicycle, but merely also gave you title to it”. But 
such a response creates obvious conflict: both A and B have the “right” to use the bicycle 
incompatibly. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Rothbardian view of property aims to 
eliminate such conflicts by allocating use-rights over resources in a way in which no two (or 
 
12 For an answer as to who should receive title in cases of fraudulently sold stolen property see Rothbard, Murray. 
1982/2002. The Ethics of Liberty. New York: New York University Press. p. 57-60 in which Rothbard argues that 
title to the bicycle should revert to A. Rothbard also argues that while this may seem unfair to innocent buyers, this 
can be mitigated with the purchase of title insurance. 
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more) people could ever conflict over the use of that resource. It should be obvious that whatever 
contract A created with the broker that created this double-title to the bicycle illegitimate, 
regardless of the fact that A and the broker may have voluntarily agreed to it, since it would 
create conflicting rights to the use of the bicycle. 
Now that I have argued that the double-title to property problem is a real one which 
should be taken seriously by those who support the disaggregative bundle of rights view of 
property, I will show how my account of the bank deposit as a call loan never creates a situation 
in which such a problem arises within the practice of fractional-reserve banking. Now, it may be 
the case that de jure legal interpretations of bank deposits still create a double-title to property 
problem. However, in this project, I will not argue that bank deposit contracts as presently 
constituted do not create this problem. Instead, I will argue that if bank deposits were to be 
viewed as a call loan, then no such problem would arise. 
According to the Rothbardians, there are three ways in which double-title to property can 
emerge in a fractional-reserve banking system. As Rothbard writes, “[the banker] may, for 
example, simply take the gold or cash out the vault and live it up, spending money on mansions 
or yachts” (1994/2015, 39). In this case, according to the bailment view of bank deposits, money 
held in vaults, to which title is held by depositors, is being taken by the banker giving himself 
title to the money, which creates two titles to the money in the vaults; one held my the banker 
and one held by the depositors. The second way in which double-title to property can occur is if 
money held by banks is lent out directly to borrowers. Again, according to the bailment view, 
title to money held by the banks belongs to depositors. When the bankers lend out the money to 
borrowers, they are creating they are giving title to that money to the borrowers. In this case, 
there is a second title to money in the vaults which is not held by the banker but, instead, is held 
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by the borrowers. Now, both the depositors and the borrowers have title to the money in the 
vaults creating the double-title to property problem. The final way in which double-title to 
property can occur through fractional-reserve banking is by the creation of deposit certificate 
deposits in excess of the amount of money actually held by the bank. In this case, the banker 
creates certificate deposits which he sells to borrowers in exchange for interest. Borrowers could 
exchange these certificate deposits with others for other goods and services and those who 
bought these deposit certificates could come to the bank that issued them and present them for 
the equivalent amount of money in the vaults. In this case, deposit certificates, according to the 
bailment view of bank deposits, represent title to the money held in the vaults. This means that 
depositors have title to the money held in the vault and borrowers holding deposit certificates 
also have title to the money in the vault. Suppose that a bank holds $1,000,000 which comes 
from exactly $1,000,000 of deposits from depositors. This means that the bank has issued 
$1,000,000 in deposit certificates to those depositors. Suppose that the bank creates $100,000 in 
“new” deposit certificates and lending them out to borrowers at some rate of interest. Since, in 
the bailment view, a deposit certificate represents title to money held by the bank, there now 
exists $1,100,000 worth of “titles” to the money in the bank, but only $1,000,000 actually exists 
in the bank. At this point, $100,000 of the money in the bank has two title holders and a double-
title to property problem presents itself once again. What is most important about all of these 
accounts is that title to money deposited is never transferred from the depositor to the banker, but 
instead, remains with the depositor the entire time. As I have described above, if viewed as a call 
loan, the bank deposit does involve a transfer of title from the lender to the borrower (in this 
case, in this case from the depositor to the banker). Thus, when viewed in this way, we will see a 
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very different story emerge in all three cases in which no double-title to property ever presents 
itself. 
As I have explained above, in the case of the call loan, the lender transfers title to the 
property lent to the borrower once the contract is initiated. Title to an equivalent amount of that 
property is then transferred from the borrower to the lender when the lender demands it or “calls 
the loan”. In the case of the bank deposit, the depositor takes the role of the lender and the 
banker takes the role of the borrower. Thus, when the depositor makes a bank deposit, they are 
transferring title to the money deposited from themselves to the banker. Title to an equivalent 
amount of money is transferred to the depositor upon demanding it. Therefore, the banker only 
owes money to the depositor once it is demanded by the depositor. In the following illustrations, 
it is assumed that both the bank and the depositor are aware that they have entered into a call 
loan. 
First, consider the case of the banker who “lives it up” with the money in the bank. 
Suppose that a depositor deposits $100 in the bank and the banker takes that money and turns 
around and uses the money deposited purchase groceries. Since title to the money is held 
exclusively by the banker at this point (as the depositor has not yet demanded their money back), 
this is a completely legitimate use of the money. The loan only becomes due upon the banker 
calling the loan (i.e. demanding some amount of money from their balance). When this does 
occur, what happens is that title to the amount of money demanded by the depositor is 
transferred from the banker to the depositor. Thus, as long as the banker has title to $100 at all, 
(not necessarily the original $100 deposited) he is able to deliver the money that has become due. 
In this case, there was no time in which there were two titles to the $100. Title was given to the 
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banker upon the initiation of the bank deposit and title to a different $100 was transferred to the 
depositor when he called the loan. 
The second case, in which the banker lends out the deposited money to a borrower 
follows a similar narrative. Suppose, again, that a depositor deposits $100 in the bank. This time, 
however, the banker does not take the money and spend it on his own consumption. Instead, he 
lends the money out to a borrower at an interest rate. What has occurred here with regards to title 
to the money originally deposited? The beginning of the story is the same as previously. When 
the depositor deposited their money, they transferred title to that money to the banker. The 
banker, then, has the right to do with that money as he pleases. Then, when lending out the 
money to the borrower, title to that $100 is transferred from the banker to the borrower. Now, the 
borrower has the right to use the money how he pleases since he has title to the money, not the 
banker. In this case, there are not two titles to the money but one. Title to the original $100 
deposited is now held exclusively by the borrower. This is because when the depositor deposited 
his money in the bank, he gave up title to that $100, knowing that he would gain title to a 
different $100 from the banker when he demanded it. The banker, here, also gave up title to the 
$100 when he lent the money to the borrower. He transferred title to that $100 knowing that he 
would earn interest from the borrower and title to a different $100 at some point in the future, 
depending on their credit arrangement.13 Now, when the depositor calls their loan from the bank, 
demanding the money form their balance, the banker now transfers title to $100 of his money to 
the depositor. As was the case above, this is a different $100 than the $100 that was deposited 
originally. This is because, again, the depositor gave up title to that original $100 knowing that 
 
13 It could be the case that this would operate as another call loan, but this arrangement between a borrower from a 
bank and a bank have not been historically popular.  
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he would receive a different $100 in the future from the banker. Again, in this case we have 
instance in which there are two titles to the same piece of property at any point. When the 
deposit contract is initiated, title to the money is transferred from the depositor to the banker. 
Then, when the banker lends out the money, title to the money is transferred from the banker to 
the borrower. That is all. At that point there are no title claims on the money beyond the 
borrower. 
The third scenario, in which bankers create new deposit certificates and give them to 
borrowers in exchange for interest, is the most complicated. However, viewed as a system of call 
loans, we can see, once again, how the practice of fractional-reserve banking to the issuance of 
excess deposit certificates creates no double-title to property. In the third scenario, the beginning 
of the story is the same. The depositor deposits $100 in the bank. Again, title to that $100 is 
transferred from the depositor to the banker. Now, instead of lending out the money directly to 
the borrower, the banker creates a different form of contract. In this case, the banker, instead, 
creates more deposit certificates that are to be held, not by depositors, but by borrowers. As I 
have iterated above, in the call loan view of the bank deposit, deposit certificates do not represent 
title to money held in the bank. Rather, they give the holder of the deposit certificate the right to 
demand the equivalent amount of money held by the bank as is stated by the deposit certificate. 
This is true whether deposit certificates are held by depositors of borrowers.14 Title to the money 
in the bank is transferred the moment that the holder of the deposit certificate demands the 
money. Assume that the banker issues $100 worth of deposit certificates to the borrower. Who 
holds title to the original $100 deposited? Since deposit certificates do not represent title to the 
 
14 It should be reiterated that deposit certificates can and historically have circulated between holders as a medium of 
exchange which was easier to transport than the actual money (which had often been precious metals) which were 
usually heavy and difficult to divide. Who holds the deposit certificate is, therefore, of no value in determining what 
it contractually entitles the holder to. 
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property held in the bank, neither the depositor, nor the borrower, can be said to have title to 
money in the bank as both of them hold only deposit certificates. In this case, the banker has title 
to the $100 which was transferred to him upon the initiation of the deposit contract. No other 
transfer of title to took place. Now, when either the depositor or the borrower demand money 
from the bank, title to some $100 (although, again, not necessarily the original $100 deposited) is 
transferred from the banker to the depositor or borrower that demands it. If both the depositor 
and borrower demand the money on the same day, this too does not create a double-title to the 
money. Instead, two separate $100s are transferred from the stock of money that the banker has 
title to.15 Again, in this scenario there is no case in which title to the same money is held by two 
people. Title to money deposited is held exclusively by the banker. Title to a different $100 is 
transferred from the banker to either the depositor or the borrower up their demanding it. 
Conclusion 
 
 As I have shown above, when viewed as a call loan, not a bailment, the supposed 
problem of the double-title to property does not arise. Instead, through the initiation of call loan 
contracts and the creation of deposit certificates giving the holder the right to call upon a loan, 
fractional-reserve banking can take place without once creating one piece of property with title to 
it being held by more than one person. In this way, the title-transfer theory of contract can allow 
for the practice of fractional-reserve banking through a series of call loans which let depositors 
act as they do today, receiving interest on money deposited and bankers to act the way they do 
today, earning interest on money lent or deposit certificates created. The practice of fractional-
 
15 The obvious objection, that this is not possible when the banker does not have title to $200 to his name, will be 
dealt with in the following chapter. 
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reserve banking, as we know today, viewed in this way, can satisfy the Rothbardians in never 




Chapter 3 – Practical Implications 
 
In the second chapter, we saw that the bank deposit can be properly be viewed as a call 
loan. This means that the bank deposit is a loan contract in which title to the money is transferred 
from the depositor to the bank not a bailment contract in which title to the money is retained by 
the depositor. This view regards the deposit of money with a bank to be a transfer of title to that 
money from the depositor to the banker. Once the depositor “calls” their loan, demanding money 
from the bank, title to the amount of money deposited transfers from the banker to the depositor. 
Thus, the money deposited is not “due” to the depositor until they actually demand it. In this 
chapter we will explore some of the practical implications of this account of the bank deposit. 
Specifically, we are going to explore how this affects bankruptcy proceedings, the appropriate 
reserve ratios for fractional-reserve banks, and how contracts stipulating the agreement to enter 
into a call loan might look. 
Bankruptcy 
 
 What the previous chapter has argued is that when a depositor makes a deposit with a 
bank this should be viewed as the creation of a call loan in which the depositor lends money to 
the bank which can be called by that depositor at any time. Thus, bank deposits represent good-
faith loans between depositor and the bank. In the same way that a lender is owed money at the 
date of maturity of their loan, depositors lending on a call loan basis are owed money when they 
demand it. Thus, depositors should be treated like any other creditor in a bankruptcy situation; 
depositors, like other lenders must incur the risk of the borrower not being able to repay their 
loans. What the previous chapter has shown is that the actions of bankers who operate with the 
risk of becoming insolvent, as all businesses do, have acted no more fraudulently than other 
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businesses who are unable to repay their loans. When bankers are unable to repay depositors, it is 
the same as any other debtor who, through entrepreneurial error, is unable to pay their loans 
rather than, as Rothbard would contend, “the uncovering of a criminal act” (Rothbard, 
1994/2015, 41). 
Thus, the process for deciding which creditors are to receive money and how much is no 
different than the process for deciding how remaining assets should be split between creditors in 
any instance of bankruptcy.16 In the case of the limited liability companies, in which 
shareholders of corporations cannot be pursued for their personal assets and that creditors are 
only entitled to the assets of the corporation,17 the creditors may take all remaining assets of the 
company up until the amount they are owed. However, since the company has declared 
bankruptcy, not every creditor will be able to receive everything they have owed. There may be 
some creditors who have gained a contractual privilege in being paid out first if the company did 
become bankrupt. For example, it may be that lender A lends to company B only on the 
condition that in the case of bankruptcy, their loan is repaid to them before any other creditors 
have the right to claim money owed to them. Or, creditors may be have to take a share of 
remaining company assets in proportion to the amount of money they lent. For example, if a 
 
16 See Rothbard, Murray. 1982/2002. The Ethics of Liberty. New York: New York University Press. p. 144 Rothbard 
argued that bankruptcy was not a legitimate option under the title-transfer theory of contracts. He argued that “if the 
defaulting debtor is not able to pay, he has still stolen the property of the creditor by not making his agreed upon 
delivery of the creditor’s property” and that debtors could only be relieved of their debts by forgiveness by their 
creditors. 
17 See Rothbard, Murray. 1970/2009. Power & Market. Auburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute. p. 1144, in which 
Rothbard argues that while bankruptcy is an illegitimate “out” for debtors to break free from their debts, limited 
liability privileges could not be legitimately granted by governments but could be stipulated in contracts between 
companies and their creditors: 
[C]orporations are not at all monopolistic privileges; they are free associations of individuals 
pooling their capital. On the purely free market, such men would simply announce to their creditors 
that their liability is limited to the capital specifically invested in the corporation, and that beyond 
this their personal funds are not liable for debts, as they would be under a partnership arrangement. 
It then rests with the sellers and lenders to this corporation to decide whether or not they will transact 
business with it. If they do, then they proceed at their own risk. 
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company had $1,000,000 in outstanding debts, $500,000 payable to A, $300,000 payable to B, 
and $200,000 payable to C, and when the company went bankrupt it had remaining assets of 
$500,000, then A would receive $250,000, B would receive $150,000, and C would receive 
$100,000. Regardless of one’s preference for how limited liability companies should proceed in 
paying their creditors during bankruptcy proceedings, the same can be applied to banks who 
have become insolvent. 
The case of the unlimited liability company is slightly different. Creditors would not only 
have a right to the assets of the company, but also the assets of its shareholders. Imagine the 
same scenario above with the company with $1,000,000 in outstanding debts. Creditors who 
could only secure half of what is owed to them by taking from the remaining company assets, 
could now take from the assets of the individuals owned the company. In this case, A can receive 
up to the full $500,000 they are owed, B the full $300,000 they are owed, and C the full 
$200,000, taking half from the remaining company assets and the rest from the assets of the 
shareholders.18 Unlimited liability banks would be no different. Depositors who had lent money 
to banks are still owed the money that they lent. Thus, if there is no limited liability protection in 
place, the depositors should be free to take from the shareholders who owe the depositors the 
balances of their accounts. Once again, bankruptcy proceedings for banks need be no different 





18 If the shareholders themselves do not have sufficient funds to pay the creditors, they too must declare bankruptcy. 
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Responsibility in Treasury Management 
 
Even if we accept my argument that fractional-reserve banking can be viewed as 
legitimate under the title-transfer theory of contract, there still remains a question of the “right” 
reserve ratio for fractional-reserve banks. The great problem with fractional-reserve banking is 
that it creates the possibility for the bank to “run out” of money and not be able to pay back 
everyone who demands money. This can occur at any time if the bank does not have proper 
reserve ratios but, historically, the greatest problems with banks being unable to pay off their 
deposit certificates have come in the form of bank runs. During a bank run, depositors, en masse, 
demand to be paid their balances in their accounts with banks. Once people hear that the bank is 
having trouble paying a few depositors, there is a storm of depositors that rush to retrieve what 
they can from the bank as they have lost faith in the bank’s solvency. When the depositors arrive, 
since the bank does not have cash equal to the amount of deposit certificates in circulation, the 
bank cannot pay everyone who demands their money. 
While this problem of determining the proper reserve ratio for a bank to keep is full of 
difficulties there are prima facie reasons to believe that some minimum reserve ratio would be 
necessary for the long-term continued operations of any fractional-reserve bank. If a bank kept 
no cash on hand (a reserve ratio of 0%), then it would be bankrupted upon any depositor 
demanding a single penny. But even a reserve ratio just above 0% does not do much more to 
deter this outcome. If a bank held $1 is cash and had $100,000 in deposit certificates circulating 
(a reserve ratio of 0.001%), then a depositor demanding $2 (0.002% of deposit certificates) 
would quickly bankrupt the bank as well. So, based on profitable, never mind ethical, business 
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practices, it would indeed be necessary that banks keep at least some percentage of their deposit 
certificate claims in cash on hand.19 
In the past in the U.S. minimum reserve ratios have been legally enforced upon banks. 
Until March of 2020 there was a minimum reserve ratio of 3% for banks with $16 million to 
$122.3 million in net transaction deposits and 10% for banks with net transaction deposits in 
excess of $122.3 million. In March of 2020 these minimum reserve ratios were moved to 0% for 
all banks of any size. The Federal Reserve explains that the importance of legally mandated 
minimum reserve ratios was as a part of U.S. monetary policy. They explain that that minimum 
reserve ratios created “a stable demand for reserves” (2020). A stable demand for reserves, in 
turn, stabilizes the demand to hold money (since banks make up a large portion of cash holdings 
in the U.S., making it easier to predict the efficacy of monetary policy changes, holding one 
variable closer to constant.  Thus, the Federal Reserve’s reasons for legally mandating a 
minimum reserve ratio was not to protect creditors from banks over-expanding credit and risking 
not being able to pay depositors, but derived its need from a monetary policy perspective. Thus, 
it seems that these ratios do not represent ethical guidelines but rather economic ones which, as 
they historically have, can be changed to meet the needs of U.S. monetary policy. 
 So, what reserve ratio should banks keep? The problem posed to the banker is not any 
different than the problem posed to any entrepreneur who must deal with probabilistic reasoning. 
In terms of profit-maximizing business practices, there are many instances in which 
entrepreneurs must deal with probabilistic reasoning. The store owner who must decide how 
 
19 With the existence of a central bank and publicly funded deposit insurance the problem becomes more difficult as 
central banks can always act as a lender of last resort printing money if necessary to lend to banks to use to pay off 
depositors who come to redeem their deposits and thus the problems created by a central bank or the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation are set aside here. 
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much of a product to order. On one hand, if they order too much, they will unnecessarily take up 
shelf space, reducing the amount of space they can use to hold other products. On the other hand, 
if they order too little, they may have unsatisfied customers or may have to resort to selling other 
products with a lower margin. In this case, the entrepreneur owner of the store must decide how 
much of that product to order based on the probability that come number of customers will 
purchase it. Banks are similarly tasked with operating under probabilistic reasoning. They must 
consider the likelihood that there will be demands for money from depositors in any given day 
and hold the appropriate amount of cash. If banks hold too much cash, they lose out on potential 
interest they could have gained by lending out the money. Or, if they have too little cash, they 
risk being unable to pay depositors when they demand money, effectively bankrupting the bank. 
Just like in the case of the store owner, the bank must use probabilistic reasoning to determine 
how much cash they should keep on hand. Making the incorrect choice will come at a detriment 
to the overall profitability of the venture. 
 One difference between deciding how much of a product to keep and how much cash to 
keep, for a business, is that that cash can often be owed to third parties at a future date. Thus, it is 
not only the shareholders of the company that are affected by treasury management but third 
parties who will, in the future, have title to money held by the company today. Consider the case 
of a small business that takes out a loan of $100,000 due in one year at an interest rate of 10% to 
purchase capital equipment to start their company. Upon purchasing the equipment, the company 
will not have the $110,000 that will be due to the lender in a year. In order to properly manage 
their cash assets, this company will have to take into account the probability of achieving 
different amounts of future revenue while managing their company if they’re going to pay off the 
loan that is due in a year. Imagine, for example, that the company had $200,000 in cash assets 
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the day before the loan became due. And suppose for the last year, they had made an average of 
$1,000 in revenue and received receivables every day. Using probabilistic reasoning, they could 
conclude that they would not be able to pay off their loan as expected if they were to make a 
purchase of $150,000 that day since it is likely that they will only gain $1,000 in cash that day 
which would only give them $51,000, far less than is necessary for paying off their loan. 
 The same can be said with bankers with one great exception: they do not know how much 
money will come due each day. Recall that in the call loan account of bank deposits, money held 
by the bank is only owed to the depositor upon them demanding the money. So, if no depositors 
demand money in a day, then nothing is due. But, if every depositor demands their entire balance 
in a day, then all bank deposits become due in one day. If this were to occur with a fractional-
reserve bank it would be guaranteed that the bank could not pay off all the loans that have 
become due. 
 Thus, the call loan creates a special problem for proper treasury management practices. 
Those who hold money which was lent to them on a call loan cannot be sure when their loan will 
come due since it can be called at any time. But, once again, business which hold call loans can 
still use probabilistic reasoning to determine how much cash they should have on hand on any 
given day. In fact, we see this sort of treasury management, in which a certain amount of cash is 
held based on the probability of come event occurring, in the insurance industry. Insurance 
companies do not hold enough money pay off all their policies at once. In fact, if they were 
forced to, insurance would become virtually useless. Consider a mock example of Rothbard 
Insurance Company who provides fire insurance. Suppose their only product is $1,000,000 worth 
of fire insurance which they sell to multiple consumers. If there were a rule in place that forced 
Rothbard Insurance Company to keep enough cash on hand to pay off every policy should a fire 
63 
 
occur, then for every insurance policy it sold, it would have to have $1,000,000 in cash on hand. 
How would they fund this? Presumably by charging $1,000,000 from each consumer who 
purchases the insurance up front. But if this were the way they were forced to operate, then 
consumers wouldn’t purchase the insurance at all since it would just be easier to hold the 
$1,000,000 themselves instead of giving it to the insurance company, only for them to turn 
around and give it right back if a fire occurred. Insurance companies, who are not held to this 
standard in Canada or the U.S. are, instead, able to charge small premiums to policy holders 
who, collectively, give enough cash to the insurance company to pay off the few policies that 
actually become owed to policy owner when, say, a fire occurs. How much cash is necessary for 
the insurance companies to hold? Well that is determined by probability of a fire actually 
occurring within a period. If the Rothbard company has 100 house-fire insurance policies out, 
each with a value of $1,000,000.20 This means that if all 100 insured houses burned down today, 
it would cost them $100,000,000. But it’s not at all likely that all insured houses will burn down 
today. Suppose that of all houses insured by the Rothbard Insurance Company, it is found that 
10% are likely to have a fire in the next year. Then, the Rothbard Insurance Company should 
hold at least $10,000,000 in cash so that they are able to pay off any policies that become due. 
Of course, there will also be variations on this and in some years 12% of the houses will burn 
down and in others it will be 9%. So, in order to make sure that they have enough cash on hand, 
the insurance companies will want to keep enough cash on hand so that they do not go bankrupt. 
But, once again, they are also penalized for having too much cash on hand since they will lose 
out on potential investments that can be made with the cash they hold. Such judgements as to the 
 
20 For simplicity we will assume that either a house burns down and costs exactly $1,000,000 to repair, or it does not 
burn down at all. 
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potential variance between average insurance claims in a period and the amount of claims made 
in any given year can be determined by actuaries and other statistical analysts. 
 Fractional-reserve banks can make similar judgements about how much cash to have on 
hand on any given day. Instead of looking at the probability of a fire occurring they must 
consider the probability of a depositor demanding money, but the same logic can be applied. 
Banks can determine the average amount of money that is demanded by depositors in a day less 
the average amount of money deposited in a day and hold this amount of money as a minimum. 
Then, knowing that there will be daily variance, hold a certain amount more cash as will be 
necessary to ensure that they are always able to pay depositors when they demand money. 
The fractional-reserve bank has to take an extra consideration into account that the 
insurance companies do not: the possibility of a bank run. As mentioned above, in the case of a 
bank run, depositors lose confidence in the ability of a bank to pay its depositors. Then, 
depositors, en masse, arrive at the bank to collect their balances. This is sure to lead to 
bankruptcy as fractional-reserve banks cannot withstand every depositor demanding their money. 
No such problem presents itself with insurance since if policy holders were to lose confidence in 
the insurance company’s ability to pay off policies, they could not just begin setting their own 
houses on fire. 
Some Rothbardians have taken this risk for banks as evidence that banks cannot long 
operate under a fractional-reserve regime. In his treatise on economics, Human Action, Ludwig 
von Mises argues that “The confidence which a bank and the money-substitutes it has issued 
enjoy is indivisible. It is either present with all its clients or it vanishes entirely. If some of the 
clients lose confidence, the rest of them lose it too” (1949/1966, 439) and concludes that 
fractional-reserve banks “must go bankrupt as soon as doubts arise concerning its perfect 
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trustworthiness and solvency” (1946/1966, 447). Rothbard echoes this idea in his 1985 article, 
“Bank Runs and Water Shortages”, asking, “in what sense is a bank "sound" when one whisper 
of doom, one faltering of public confidence, should quickly bring the bank down? In what other 
industry does a mere rumor or frisson of doubt swiftly bring down a mighty and seemingly solid 
firm?” (3). Though it is perhaps hyperbole on the parts of Mises and Rothbard, their claim that 
some depositors losing confidence in a Bank’s ability to pay depositors when they demand 
money is unfounded. The existence of Rothbardians who deposit money with fractional-reserve 
banks is a clear counter example. There are “whispers of doom” about the inability for banks to 
repay depositors among Rothbardians but banks have not collapsed because of it. In the winter of 
2018, I was convinced of the Rothbardian view that fractional-reserve banking was inherently 
fraudulent. I told all my friends, family, and colleagues, “Get your money out of banks! They 
don’t have it and can’t repay you!” But this did not lead to a collapse of Toronto Dominion 
Canada Trust bank. Therefore, the idea that any breach of trust in a bank from some of its 
depositors must necessarily lead to the insolvency of that bank is not true. 
While banks can become quickly insolvent in the case of a bank run, this risk is 
something that must be mitigated by fractional-reserve banks just as any other entrepreneurial 
risk must be mitigated. The call loan view conceptualizes bank depositors as creditors who must 
have a favourable view of banks to which they are lending money. Joseph Salerno argues that the 
importance of reputation is unique to fractional-reserve banking. He points to Washington 
Mutual which was a long-trusted bank in the U.S. in which collapsed only a week after the 
Lehman Brothers, an investment house. According to Salerno a slight distrust in Washington 
Mutual’s ability to pay depositors, stemming from the failure of Lehman Brothers, was the 
reason that a bank so large could fail in only a week. Salerno claims that this too would have 
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been the fate of other long entrusted banks “had the Fed and Treasury not acted aggressively to 
bail out the largest banks in the fall of 2008” (2012). Salerno claims that “despite their long 
existence, despite their reputation for solidity, the slightest doubt that they were no longer able to 
pay off their deposit claims would have brought them down within a week after the Washington 
Mutual failure” (2012). Salerno contrasts this with Tylenol in which their reputation was 
damaged from some of their pills being laced with potassium cyanide leading to the death of 
seven people. Salerno points out that “the parent company, Johnson & Johnson, [was] able to 
maintain its own business goodwill by its successful and prompt response” (2012). Reputation 
may play a special role in the case of fractional-reserve banks but this is also true of product 
labelling companies, professional certification companies, and public accounting companies. 
Consider, for example, the Enron scandal in which Arthur Andersen, the company auditing 
Enron at the time, were complicit in the fraudulent reporting of over $100 billion. While Arthur 
Andersen could legally continue operations in 2005, they were unable to since no one would 
trust them to audit their company in the future. Thus, their reputation played an integral role in 
the company’s success and a loss of reputation lead to its demise. Thus, reputation having the 
ability to completely collapse a company is not unique to fractional-reserve banking. Insofar as 
we can trust entrepreneurs in the accounting industry to protect their reputation, we can trust 
fractional-reserve banks to do the same. 
 As we have already seen, banks are incentivized to hold a certain amount of cash on hand 
so that they can stay solvent. But this does not preclude a poor entrepreneur from making 
unsound business decisions that would lead to the bankruptcy of his bank. Since stakeholders, 
specifically creditors, are negatively harmed by a bank going bankrupt (depositors are not able to 
call the deposits they made), there is an ethical concern with negligence on behalf of the bank 
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owner. If they hold a negligently small reserve ratio, then depositors will be negatively harmed 
in not being able to call money which they have a contractual right to. In 2011, Christopher 
Cowton noted that “Contemporary academic and policy discussions of corporate governance 
tend to accord primacy to the interests of shareholders … [and] the interests of creditors tend to 
be neglected” (21). Cowton argues, however, that company law has historically concerned itself 
with three main groups: the shareholders (or members) of the company; its directors and, to a 
lesser extent, its senior managers (whether they are directors or not); and its creditors” (2011, 25) 
and attempts to rectify the “the neglected third element of this trinity, the creditors” (2011, 25). 
 One way in which creditors can be protected in their loans to limited liability companies 
can be through regulation surrounding the relationship between the company and its members. 
This includes two proposals from Cowton. The first is “restricting the circumstances in which 
shareholders can be paid a dividend” (2011, 28) and second, “when the company is insolvent, 
removing control from [shareholders]” (2011, 28). Thus, for Cowton there are “two possible 
modes of governance for a limited liability company” (2011, 28). The first mode of governance 
is a “normal” (2011, 28) one in which shareholders are held to be of ultimate importance. This 
form of governance occurs when “creditors’ fixed claims need to be capable of being met” 
(2011, 28). The second form of governance, in which the creditors are of ultimate importance in 
company decision making must take place when these claims from creditors are no longer able to 
be met. This second mode, the “distressed” (2011, 28) mode of governance “the company is 
governed in the interests of creditors, with shareholders hoping that there might be something 
left for them or that the company might eventually return to viability and hence normal 
governance mode” (2011, 28). In the case of banking, If reserve ratios were to ever fall below an 
acceptable level of risk in which it would be unlikely that “creditors’ fixed claims [would] be 
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capable of being met” (2011, 28), then, with these restrictions in place, banks would be forced to 
increase their reserve ratio in order that they “eventually return to viability and hence normal 
governance mode” (2011, 28). Thus, shareholders would be eager to move away from the 
“distressed” for of governance since their own concerns would not be highest priority for 
company management insofar as they would lose control of the company and they could not be 
paid dividends, and would want to return to the “normal” mode of governance. 
Some standing law may already be in place in the U.S. which serves to protect creditors 
from fraudulent or predatory actions from debtors. Steven L. Schwarcz, in his 1996 article, 
“Rethinking a Corporation’s Obligations to Creditors”, argues, that companies owe a duty unto 
their creditors that goes beyond that which is necessary to meet their obligations to shareholders. 
Schwarcz argues that a company’s obligation to its creditors stems from three different sources: 
Contractual obligations, creditors’ rights, and the obligation of good faith in commercial 
transactions. Contractual obligations don’t exist between all debtors and creditors but are 
dependent upon certain stipulations written into the contract between debtor and creditor. As 
Schwarcz explains, “The loan agreement or other contract governing the particular relationship 
between the debtor and a creditor typically will contain covenants restricting the debtor's actions 
in an attempt to ensure that it remains creditworthy” (1996, 651). Cowton lists a few options that 
creditors might want to have built into contracts before loaning out money such as securing the 
loan against a company asset, a personal guarantee from directors of the company (to mitigate 
the limited liability status of the company), and limiting the activity of the debtor so that they 
remain more creditworthy (2011, 26). This final solution could be used in a contract between 
bank and depositor in which deposit contracts would stipulate a minimum reserve ratio. Thus, 
just like when acting as a creditor to any other business, there would be no guarantee of solvency 
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and an ability to pay when money is demanded, but this would limit the likelihood of banks 
overextending credit and having too little cash on hand on any given day. 
 Second, Schwarcz points to creditors’ rights. One such example of creditors’ rights is 
“fraudulent conveyance law, which allows a debtor's trustee in bankruptcy to avoid certain asset 
transfers or obligations incurred "with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud" creditors” (1996, 
652). This law prohibits soon-to-be bankrupt companies from giving money to third parties that 
would otherwise be collected by creditors by purchasing assets at greatly inflated prices in order 
to purposely keep that money from being distributed to creditors upon bankruptcy. This sort of 
restriction would help minimize the instances of negligent treasury management such as the ones 
mentioned above in which companies might make large purchases just prior to a debt coming 
due.21 In the case of banking, creditors could be protected by similar restrictions against the 
transfer of cash assets. If a bank intentionally dropped their reserve ratio by purchasing assets at 
inflated prices to limit the amount of money that could be claimed by depositors when they go 
bankrupt, fraudulence conveyance law could make it that the banks’ trustees would not have to 
honor these purchases. This would decrease the incentive to attempt to make any such fraudulent 
transfers of cash and protect depositors from greater losses from a bank’s insolvency. 
 Third, Schwarcz says that, “[c]ommercial transactions have an implied obligation of good 
faith” (1996, 656). This means that “opportunistic behavior should be prevented in circumstances 
that could not have been contemplated in advance, and that implicit rules of conduct should be 
recognized if they arise from widespread courses of dealing in an industry or from particular 
courses of dealing between specific parties” (1996, 658). An obligation of good faith, according 
 
21 This would not, however, eliminate this risk as it is possible that such practices may occur as a form of 
entrepreneurial error, and not with the intent to defraud creditors. 
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to Schwarz, attempts to balance the “reasonable expectations” (1996, 658) of the creditors with 
the ““legitimate business” needs” (1996, 658) of the debtor. The reasonable expectations of the 
creditor are based on the standard business practices within the industry. Schwarcz argues that 
this obligation of good faith protects creditors when they are the weaker party in the transaction. 
However, since good faith requires that common practice within the industry be taken into 
consideration, Schwarcz argues that who the weaker party is and how the weaker party is to be 
protected must be viewed on a case by case basis.22 In the case of the depositor and the bank, the 
depositor could plausibly be viewed as the weaker party since they lack the sophistication and 
bargaining power that banks do. Depositors are often individuals whereas most banking in 
Canada is done with large complex corporations. Thus, it is banks that should be hindered from 
making opportunistic behaviour if it this behaviour poses a threat to depositors’ ability to collect 
money and could not be reasonably expected by them. 
This has at least one interesting implication for fractional-reserve banking practices. 
There may be scenarios in which banks see opportunities to extend credit to the point that they 
would have to decrease their reserve ratio below a point which they would normally deem 
acceptable since the risk of becoming insolvent does not outweigh the potential gains from the 
credit extension. For example, a bank that normally holds a 20% reserve ratio may find it 
profitable through a cost-benefit analysis to lend out money to an up and coming start up by 
lowering their reserve ratio to 15%. If this is abnormal and goes against the “implicit rules of 
conduct … [that] arise from widespread courses of dealing in [the banking] industry” (Schwarcz, 
1996, 658) and therefore could be reasonably expected by depositors, then the implied obligation 
 
22 Schwarcz points out that when banks are creditors themselves, they can rarely be viewed as the weaker party but 
offers no analysis of banks as debtors to depositors. 
71 
 
of good faith may protect depositors from banks acting opportunistically, investing in the start up 
and lowering their reserve ratio, and risking being unable to repay depositors. This does not limit 
banks’ ability to act opportunistically if they have held higher reserves than could already be 
reasonably expected from depositors. With the same example above, if the bank had originally 
held a 25% reserve ratio and it would be reasonably expected by depositors that no bank would 
lower their reserves below 20% then such opportunistic behaviour would be permitted as it does 
not go against the reasonable expectations of the depositors. Instead, depositors would have 
expected that the “implicit rules implicit rules of conduct … [that] arise from widespread courses 
of dealing in [the banking] industry” (Schwarcz, 1996, 658) were to maintain a reserve ratio of 
20% and therefore no reasonable expectations were dashed when dropping the reserve ratio to 
that level. 
 As mentioned above, the question of the proper reserve ratio for banks to keep is fraught 
with considerations. There are standard risk-management and profitability concerns that force 
banks to find a balance between risk of insolvency with the rewards of extending credit. But 
there are other legal-ethical concerns that these businesses that must consider when deciding how 
much money such as contractual obligations, a consideration for creditors’ rights, and operating 
in good faith with creditors. These considerations are already found in existing law within 
western societies and have protected creditors in other industries. Banking should be no 
different. With the exception of the threat of a bank run, which can be factored into actuarial risk 
calculations, banks, like other debtors, face similar entrepreneurial risks and ethical 





What will Contracts Look Like? 
 
 Dialogue between the Rothbardians and the Free Bankers has led to a disagreement 
surrounding the contents of bank deposit contracts. Rothbardians claim that a bank deposit must 
represent a bailment contract in which title to the money deposited is retained by the depositor. 
This is because the money, according to the Rothbardians money deposited is due “immediately” 
to the depositor and thus belongs to the depositor at all times. It is therefore deceptive, according 
to the Rothbardians, to not make clear the fractional-reserve practices of banks both to depositors 
and to those with whom the depositors exchange deposit certificates. Rothbardians, while 
maintaining their opposition to fractional-reserve banking have conceded that two potential 
remedies could legitimize the practice. Both involve particular stipulations to be built into bank 
deposit contracts. The first is proposed by Block who suggests that banks could print disclaimers 
on their deposit certificates describing the fractional-reserve practices of the bank from which the 
deposit certificate comes. Block offers the following example for a disclaimer that could be 
placed on a deposit certificate representing a 10-ounce deposit of gold by a bank with a 20% 
reserve ratio: “[O]ur policy is to keep only one-fifth of an ounce of gold on hand for each of the 
ounce value notes that we put into circulation. Since this here is a 10-ounce note, we’ve got only 
two ounces in reserve backing it” (1988, 29). According to Block, “If the preceding statement 
appears in bold lettering, and not in “small (invisible) print” the claim to voluntariness is strong 
indeed” (1988, 29) and would make fractional-reserve banking cease to be “purposefully 
deceptive” (1988, 29). 
 One objection to Block’s “warning sticker” proposal is that “[h]is example seems to 
assume that the bank would hold a fixed reserve ratio (because it specifies the precise ratio on its 
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notes)” (Selgin & White, 1996, 89). But, as Selgin and White point out, this would likely not be 
the case for banks that operate on a fractional reserve basis. Instead, “the bank and its customers 
might well both prefer, however, to allow the bank discretion to vary the ratio as prudence 
dictates” (1996, 89). This is important if we want to make room for actuarial considerations in 
risk-management for banks. As Selgin and White argue, “Under varying conditions, a varying 
ratio is necessary to maintain a constant default risk” (1996, 89). This means that at certain times 
it would be necessary for a bank to hold a higher reserve ratio than at other times in order to stay 
above the necessary threshold to be considered acting responsibly. For example, a bank may 
have a reserve ratio of 20% this month but because of an increase in demand to hold cash instead 
of deposit certificates, that bank may have to have a reserve ration of 30% the following month. 
Thus, this particular proposal seems to fail as it would be impractical and would, in some cases, 
actually hinder banks from operating with more conservative reserve ratios. 
 However, a slight adjustment to this proposal could certainly be workable. Imagine that it 
is determined that for any bank operating in some territory, it would be negligent to hold 
anything less than a 20% reserve ratio. Thus, we could prohibit any fractional-reserve banking 
which involves a reserve ratio lower than 20%. A 10-ounce deposit certificate could have a 
disclaimer which reads, ‘Our policy is to keep at least one-fifth of an ounce of gold on hand for 
each of the ounce value notes that we put into circulation. Since this here is a 10-ounce note, 
we’ve got at least two ounces in reserve backing it.’ This would not hinder banks from operating 
on more conservative ratios nor would it hinder them from changing their reserve ratio from day 
to day. 
 Whether or not these “warning stickers” would be necessary is a matter of standard 
banking practices in the area in which the bank operates. As Rothbard writes in Power and 
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Market, “if a man simply sells what he calls “bread,” it must meet the common definition of 
bread held by consumers, and not some arbitrary specification” (1970/2009, 1098). This would 
be the same for the employment of bank deposit contracts. If a bank offers to hold a “bank 
deposit” for their customers, then the bank deposit must meet the common definition of a bank 
deposit. This may vary from place to place and from time to time. If one were in an area where it 
was well known that banks operated on a fractional-reserve basis, then when creating deposit 
certificates for depositors, no such warning sticker would be necessary as both the depositor and 
others with whom the depositor would exchange the deposit certificate would know that the bank 
from which the deposit certificate came, was operating on a fractional-reserve basis. However, if 
one were in an area where 100% reserve banking was the norm and the common definition of a 
bank deposit was one which involved the bank keeping all money deposited on hand at all times, 
then such warning stickers may be necessary.23 They would warn both depositor and those with 
whom the depositor exchanges the deposit certificate with of the special practice of fractional-
reserve banking taking place at that bank from which the deposit certificate came. Thus, this 
“warning sticker” proposal serves as an excellent tool that could have use where those who use 
deposit certificates would be unsure of the practices of each bank. 
 The second proposal that some Rothbardians claim would legitimize fractional-reserve 
banking is to insert “option clauses” into the deposit contracts which would provide a grace 
period for banks to pay out when depositors demand the money in their account.24 These option 
 
23 Selgin and White, relying on the same court decisions cited by Rothbard “maintain that the common definition or 
default meaning of a "bank deposit" is, as courts have recognized, that of a debt claim against the bank and not of a 
warehouse receipt” (p. 88-89) but do not posit that this implies any particular reserve ratio. 
24 See, Checkland, S. G. 1975. Scottish Banking: A History, 1695-1973, p. 67 in which he provides a copy of a 
Scottish bank note (deposit certificate) with just a such a clause which reads, 
The Royal Bank of Scotland . . . is hereby obliged to pay to |name| Or the Bearer, One Pound Sterling 
on demand Or, in the Option of the Directors, One pound Six pence Sterling at the End of Six 
Months after the day of the demand & for ascertaining the demand & Option of the Directors, the 
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clauses would be for a fixed period and would not allow for indefinite suspension of payment. 
As Selgin and White ask, “[W]ho, after all, would freely choose to take a permanently 
suspendable note?” (1996, 89). For example, deposit certificates would be payable “on demand” 
or, in the case that the bank did not have sufficient funds to pay when the money was demanded, 
the deposit certificate became payable in six months from the date it was demanded.25 Hoppe 
admits that “such a practice [of issuing option clauses] would indeed dispose of the charge of 
fraud” (1994, 71). 
 This practice would undoubtedly make fractional-reserve banking less risky. Banks who 
found trouble paying their depositors when they demanded money could give themselves extra 
time to find liquid funds to give to depositors. By adding these option clauses, the demand 
deposits would become time deposits once deposited funds were demanded. With the above 
example of a six month option clause, the bank would be operating as if they were holding a six-
month time deposit from the time the deposited funds were demanded and would owe the money 
demanded at the maturity date, six months in the future. This relieves the Rothbardian concerns 
of double-title to property since banks who lend out money held on deposit are no longer, as the 
Rothbardians posit, lending out money that belongs to someone else. Instead, under this new 
contractual agreement which includes an option clause, banks would be lending out money that 
is due some time in the future (the day it is demanded plus the length of the option clause) and 
thus properly belongs to the bank now. 
 
Accomptant & One of the Tellers of the Bank are hereby ordered to Mark & Sign this Note on the 
back of the same. 
This version of the option clause provides for additional interest to be paid to the depositor in the case that 
the bank could not pay on the day money was demanded. 
25 As with the above example, it could include a higher interest rate for those six months but it need not necessarily. 
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Under the Rothbardian view, that demand deposits are due immediately, there is a 
question as to what the appropriate length of any such time deposit could be. Suppose that a bank 
offered demand deposits with an option clause which gave them an additional five seconds to 
pay depositors after they demand it. It would seem that this would be almost no different than a 
demand deposit since it would only give an additional five seconds to repay the depositors which 
is nearly the same as owing them the instantly. Block and Barnett, who consider lending out 
money held on a time deposit to be legitimate but lending out money held on a demand deposit 
to be illicit, consider this to be a “continuum problem” (2009, 711) asking the following: “The 
continuum problem arises when we ask whether it is OK to take in a time deposit for say, 1 
month, and lend it out? Of course, But how about one week? one day? one hour? one minute? 
one second? That is, just how instantaneous does “instantly” have to be for the purpose of 
determining whether a transfer of funds to a bank constitutes a demand or a time deposit?” 
(2009, 711). The same problem arises with option clauses. How much time does the option 
clause have to give the bankers to pay demanded money to, for Hoppe, “dispose of the charge of 
fraud” (1994, 71)? 
 No such problem arises with the call loan view of bank deposits. Recall that under the 
Rothbardian view of the bank deposit deposited funds are due to the depositor immediately 
regardless of whether or not it has yet been demanded. In contrast, under the call loan view, 
deposited funds are due to the depositor only once it is demanded. Thus, adding an option clause 
giving an additional five seconds to bankers to pay depositors does not flip a switch from money 
deposited being due immediately to it being due ‘when demanded plus five seconds’. Instead, the 
addition of an option clause under the call loan view would hold that the money is always due 
‘when demanded plus the length of the option’ and a call loan with no such option clause is due 
77 
 
‘when demanded’. Since, as I have shown in the previous chapter, that viewing funds deposited 
as due to depositors when they are demanded there is no need to force depositors to agree to such 
contracts to “switch” demand deposits into time deposits. And thus, requiring an option clause 
would reflect an infringement on the depositor’s right to use the money they own as it would 
limit depositors’ and banks’ abilities to form contracts and thus violate the rights that property 
owners have under the Rothbardian view property which includes the right to give up title to 
your property. This includes giving up title under mutually agreed upon credit arrangements such 
as the call loan. 
Conclusion 
 
 If we accept that fractional reserve banking can be practiced legitimately when deposits 
are viewed as call loans, then we are led to inquire as to the practical implications of this view of 
deposits. Above, I have briefly outlined some of these implications. While fractional-reserve 
banking requires some special considerations, such as the possibility of bank runs and the 
potential requirement to disclose reserve ratios, the response about how fractional-reserve banks 
should interact with creditors is that they should act as any other business would. Banks must act 
in accordance with standard practices and are bound by the same ethical rules that govern the 
relationship between debtor and creditor as any other business. This includes acting in 
accordance with normal industry standards. Banks should be bound to standard ethical practice 
for banks the same way grocery stores are bound to standard ethical practices for grocery stores. 
In the case of bankruptcy, creditors, including depositors, should be given the same rights 
as any creditors who stands to gain less than they are owed from insolvent debtors. Creditors 
may gain these rights contractually or otherwise, but this is, again, no different than the way 
creditors gain rights when lending money to other companies. Further, banks, like any other 
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business, are incentivized to practice sound risk-management strategies in order to avoid 
insolvency. These practices, for fractional-reserve banks requires that they make actuarial 
calculations regarding the risk of depositors demanding money and thus having money become 
due. But this is, again, similar to the other risks that other businesses must take into consideration 
when managing their treasury. There always exists the possibility of unexpected cash outflows 
such as possible torts against the company, and other unforeseen expenses. The fact that 
businesses are able to successfully account for these future cash outflows is best exemplified by 
the insurance industry which always has obligations to pay out cash at unknown times in the 
future. Treasury management practices for banks are also bound by the same ethical practices of 
other debtors insofar as banks must maintain proper reserve-ratios as to respect creditors’ rights 
and not arbitrarily lower their reserve-ratios in order to capitalize on opportunities which fall 
outside of the normal scope of banking operations. 
Finally, fractional reserve banking must make their practices known to depositors. This 
may include requiring banks to issue “warning stickers” on their deposit certificates to let 
customers know about their fractional-reserve practices but this is only true if there isn’t already 
a general knowledge that banks do practice fractional-reserve banking. This, again, is no 
different than any other company who must be honest about the products they are selling. If one 
sells bread, they must sell what is commonly known as bread and if someone offers to hold a 
bank deposit, they must hold what it commonly known as a bank deposit. If the common 
definition of a bank deposit is a bailment from depositor to bank in which the bank is always 
expected to have the bailed money on hand, then these warning stickers would be necessary. If 
the common definition of a bank deposit is a loan from depositor to creditor in which the bank 
may lend out the money lent, then no such warning sticker is necessary. 
79 
 
As I have attempted to make clear, the extent to which we trust any business to partake in 
risk-management while holding debt, we can similarly trust banks. Creditors, in the case of 
banks depositors, should be free to take on that risk as they see fit. As long as they are following 
standard practices for risk management, treasury management, and disclosure to creditors, they 






In the bailment view of a bank deposit, bankers are lending out money which doesn’t 
belong to them but, instead, belongs to depositors. Thus, two people, the borrower and the 
depositor, have title to the same piece of money. This is the double-title to property problem. 
This project has offered a conception of bank deposits in which depositors are creditors to the 
banks by holding debt which is callable at any time. This is the essence of the call loan view of 
bank deposits. This conceptual view allows for us to dissolve of the problem of double-title to 
property which arises when banks are viewed as bailors. Instead, depositors are viewed as 
creditors and banks as debtors. With this conception of bank deposits, when banks lend out 
deposited money they are lending out money which belongs to themselves, not depositors. Thus, 
at no time do two people ever have title to the same piece of property. 
 This thesis also explores the practical implications of the call loan view. The relationship 
between bank and depositor under the call loan view is that of debtor and creditor. Thus, banks 
must operate in ways which protects creditors the same way any other debtor does. As I have 
argued, how banks should do this is no different than what is already suggested by existing 
business ethics literature on the rights and proper treatment of creditors. As long as banks are 
following proper treasury management practices and being honest in their contracts with 
depositors, then banks should be free to operate on a fractional- reserve basis. 
There still remains a great deal of work that can be done in order to more fully 
understand the nature of ethical fractional-reserve banking practices. How to properly practice 
fractional-reserve banking requires that we analyze the many factors which effect the 
relationship between banks and their depositors. This project does not, for example, consider the 
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implications that arise with the existence of a central bank and a publicly funded deposit 
insurance corporation such as the FDIC. Thus, further research can be done to explain the 
relationship between ethical fractional-reserve practices with and without the existence of these 
institutions. Beyond this, more can be done in the way of understanding how banks can act to 
improve public trust. As has been explained, many industries rely on public trust in order to 
operate at all. Banks are similar in that a complete collapse of public trust would keep them from 
operating on a fractional-reserve basis as depositors would quickly ask for deposited funds to be 
returned. Thus, future research about what destroys or maintains public trust with banks will help 
explain how fractional-reserve banks might operate more efficiently and with less risk in the 
future. This project offers a starting point from which to view these operational and ethical 
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